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DELIBERATE WARTIME ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHONY LEIBLER*
When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in fighting against it to take it,
thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for
thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down; for is the tree
of the field a man that it should be besieged by thee?
(Deuteronomy 20:19)
INTRODUCTION
A. The Persian Gulf Conflict: Fear, Outrage and
Demands for Justice
The period of January 17 to February 28, 1991 entranced the internation-
al community in a manner unprecedented in history. The realities of warfare
in the 1990s were continuously and instantaneously relayed from a tiny war
zone in the Persian Gulf to millions of homes in every country across the
globe.
As authorities feverishly recorded and reported casualties, property
damage, fluctuations in world economies and shifts in political alliances-a
more sinister threat began to emerge in the waters of the Gulf and in the
skies above Kuwait. Graphic images of massive environmental destruction
were almost biblical in their proportions. An ominous new dimension to the
Gulf War was beginning to unfold. One on-sight reporter described the
scene as a "Man-Made Hell on Earth" and gave the following eye-witness
account:
Dante would have felt right at home in Kuwait, a desert paradise that has
suddenly been transformed into an environmental inferno. Across the land
hundreds of orange fireballs roar like dragons, blasting sulfurous clouds
high into the air. Soot falls like gritty snowflakes, streaking windshields
and staining clothes. From the overcast skies drips a greasy black rain,
while sheets of gooey oil slap against a polluted shore.
Expressions of disbelief and horror reverberated around the globe. The
initial outrage came from the media: "What kind of people would do this?
That's what we kept asking ourselves in Kuwait City yesterday. Day had
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been turned into night, so thick was the canopy of smoke as the nation's oil
wells burned gold and orange along the black-fringed horizon."2
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) issued the following
caution: "What is being destroyed today-and the damage which has been
and could be caused could stay with us-all of us-for a very long time. It
will affect generations to come which have had no say in the matter." 3
In the United States, senators urged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
be put on trial for crimes against the environment: "Senator Liberman said
there was substantial sentiment in Congress to create some kind of treaty or
convention that would make clear that vindictive assaults on the environment
like this would be punished-and punished severely." 4 In Strasbourg, the
Council of Europe's 183-member parliamentary assembly condemned "this
disgraceful attack on the environment" and called for a war crimes tribunal
similar to those set up in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War I.
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which international
law answers this universal demand for accountability for deliberate wartime
environmental damage.
B. International Law Taken by Surprise!
Until the Persian Gulf Conflict, war and environmental damage arose
independently, from time to time, as threats to our survival. Accordingly,
separate and unrelated regimes, both legal and political, evolved to address
these threats. The laws of war, for example, focused on the treatment of
prisoners and the use of weapons of mass murder. Environmental protection
laws, on the other hand, focused on standards of care and civil liability for
negligent (unintentional) environmental damage.
To the horror of the international community, the Persian Gulf Conflict
brought about the "marriage" of war and environmental damage and the
"birth" of a new menace-deliberate wartime destruction of the environment.
As one observer commented:
The gulf war was the first conflict in which ecoterrorism played a major
role m a combatant's battle plan, and even though the fighting lasted only
42 days, it may turn out to be the most ecologically destructive conflict in
the history of warfare. Experts are still sorting out the effects on the air,
land and sea, some of which may persist for generations to come.6
2. Robert Fisk, Crisis in the Gulf- Something evil has visited Kuwait City, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb.
28, 1991, at 1.
3. United Nations Environment Program, Gulf War Oil Spill: UNEP Appeals for International Action,
News Release, 1991 No. 2.
4. Hussein called environmental terrorist, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1991, at C8.
5. Robert Rice, Gulf oil spill another crime against humanity, FIN. REV., Jan. 31, 1991, at 3.
6. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 1, at 37.
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Despite the outrage and demands for justice which echoed throughout the
world community as it witnessed the environmental holocaust of the Gulf
War, the international legal system was taken by surprise. As a result very
few, if any, direct sources of liability have evolved. It is therefore necessary
to examine various international law regimes which-although they do not
directly address the issue of deliberate wartime environmental damage-might
provide a basis for liability.
C. Outline of Article
Our search for legal answers to the problem of deliberate wartime
environmental damage will be divided into three successive phases.
First, we shall examine the regime of International Environmental Law
with a view to extracting principles relevant to deliberate victimization of the
environment during war. Section I will consider the general principles of
responsibility for environmental damage and Section II will focus on specific
treaties dealing with marine pollution, air pollution, and environmental
modification techniques.
Secondly, we shall examine the regime of International Law of War with
a view to extracting principles which restrict or prohibit deliberate destruc-
tion of the environment. Section III will focus on the Law of Force ("jus ad
bellum") which regulates the right of states to use force per se. Section IV
will examine the Law of Warfare ("jus in bello") which, independently of the
lawfulness of the use of force per se, sets out the permissible means and
methods of conducting warfare.
Thirdly, Section V will draw together the results of the previous analysis
and present a concise picture of existing international law on the subject of
deliberate wartime environmental damage. The application of this law will
be demonstrated in the context of the Persian Gulf Conflict. Finally, various
avenues of reform will be explored and relevant conclusions stated.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Overview
International Environmental Law is a new and dynamic legal regime
evolving in response to the rapid growth of industrialization, the expansion
of transportation, the population explosion and the use of highly noxious
substances, all of which have greatly exacerbated harm to the environment
in the post World War Two era.
For present purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the regime has
developed primarily in response to a series of environmental accidents.
Catastrophes such as the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, the Amoco Cadiz
collision in 1978 and the Chernobyl explosion in 1986, all resulted in the
establishment of standards of care and levels of responsibility designed to
minimize accidents in the future and clarify their legal consequences. The
19921
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legal regime did not, until very recently, even contemplate deliberate or
vindictive environmental pollution such as the pumping of oil into the sea or
the ignition of oil-well fires which occurred in the Persian Gulf Conflict.
Nevertheless, to the extent that these laws apply to negligent or careless
pollution, it is logical to assume that they must certainly apply to deliberate
pollution.
B. The Principle of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage
The general principles of International Environmental Law made their
first appearance in the 1941 Trail Smelter Case7 relating to injuries caused
to the State of Washington by sulphur dioxide emissions from a smelter plant
in British Colombia. In the absence of any international judicial decisions
on the issue, the Special Arbitral Tribunal examined numerous decisions of
the United States Supreme Court" and deduced the following principle:
No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.'
Applying this principle, the Tribunal held that Canada was responsible in
international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter and had "the duty...
to see to it that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of
the Dominion under international law.""° The Tribunal ordered reparation
by way of injunctive relief and the payment of an indemnity.
For the next thirty years, the Trail Smelter Case was consistently cited
as laying down a general principle of state responsibility for environmental
damage." Any remaining doubt as to whether the principle was a norm of
customary international law was conclusively removed by Principle 21 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations on the Human Environ-
ment: 2 "States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 3 The
7. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
8. E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (water pollution); and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Company, 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution).
9. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
10. Id. at 1966.
11. See, e.g., Canada-United States: Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
676, 678.
12. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the UN Conference on
the Human Environment at Stockholm, June 16, 1972, Section I of the Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14 and Corr. 1 (1972)
(adopted with no roll-call vote recorded), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
13. Id.
[Vol. 23
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1992], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss1/3
DELIBERATE WARTIME ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
Declaration is not itself legally binding. However, Principle 21 was the
culmination of thirty years of international judicial development and is
universally recognized as a statement of customary international law.14
Further development of the general principle of responsibility for
environmental damage is being carried out by the International Law
Commission (the "ILC") in its draft Articles on "International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International
Law."" 5 The 33 Articles adopted to date are the subject of much debate
and, as acknowledged by the ILC itself, cannot be said to represent
customary international law." However, having established the existence
of the general principle, the draft Articles will (together with other legal
instruments) serve as useful guides to the individual elements of the
principle.
C. Elements of the Principle
Having established the principle of state responsibility for environmental
damage, it is necessary to expand upon the parameters of that responsibility.
The existence of responsibility will depend upon the following issues: (1)
Where must the injurious act occur and where must the damage impact?; (2)
What type of damage is "environmental damage" and how much damage
must occur?; (3) What is the requisite state of mind?
1. Origin of the Injurious Act and Area of Impact
The key phrase in relation to the requisite place of origin of the injurious
acts of states is "activities within their jurisdiction or control." 7 This
phrase appears in Article 21 of the Stockholm Declaration" and Article 1
of the ILC's draft Articles. 9 With regard to the requisite area of impact,
the Trail Smelter Case only imposed liability for damage caused to "other
states."' However, concern for the global commons has increased
substantially since 1941 and hence the Stockholm Declaration extends
liability more generally to "areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion"2" such as the High Seas.
14. See 1984 I.L.C. REP. 171, 175. [hereinafter I.L.C.I.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 171, 175.
17. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, art. 21.
18. "States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control. ... " Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at 1420.
19. "The present articles apply with respect to .. . places under its jurisdiction . . . or
... under its control. . ." I.L.C., supra note 14.
20. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1911.
21. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at 1420.
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2. Nature and Quantum of Damage
The principle is only concerned with damage of an environmental
nature-in other words, pollution. Pollution is defined broadly in numerous
international instruments as: "any introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substance or energy into the environment resulting in
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living
resources and ecosystems, impair amenities or interfere with other legitimate
uses of the environment."2
As to the quantum of damage, most international instruments and arbitral
awards require "significant," "substantial" or "serious" injury or damage.'
The ILC, in its draft Articles, has not yet decided whether to specify
"appreciable" harm or "significant" harm.' In practice, none of these
terms are particularly helpful and it is difficult to extract any elaboration of
their meaning. The draft Articles do state that the damage must be "greater
than the mere nuisance or insignificant harm which is normally tolerated." '
Furthermore, there appears to be a presumption of significant harm (or a
waiving of its requirement) when pollution is caused by substances which are
highly dangerous to human life and health. Several international agreements
contain "black lists" of such substances.' The draft Articles provide the
following examples: "Flammable and corrosive materials, explosives,
oxidizants, irritants, carcinogens, mutagens and toxic, ecotoxic and
radiogenic substances, ... dangerous genetically altered organisms and
dangerous micro-organisms."27
22. This definition is quoted from the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles
Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 242, 243 (1975). Article 1(4) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea not yet in effect,
defines "pollution of the marine environment" in almost identical terms. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 1(4) U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122,
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFiCIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983).
23. See Resolution 2995 (XXVII) of the General Assembly concerning co-operation between
states in the field of the environment, 27 G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 30 (A/8730), at 42 (1973);
Recommendation of the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Leading OEC Documents 30,
35 (1978); Draft on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Article
8(2), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348, at 105 (1981). The Trail Smelter tribunal imposed liability only
in cases "of serious consequence." Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 &
1941).
24. See I.L.C supra note 14, draft Article 2(h).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wasters
and Other Matter, Annex I, August 30, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 2465; Agreement between the
United States and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383.
27. See I.L.C., supra note 14, draft Articles 2(b), 2(c), 2(d).
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3. State of Mind
Although neither the Trail Smelter Case nor the Stockholm Declaration
specify the exact state of mind necessary to violate the duty to prevent
environmental damage, it should be observed that the issue is exclusively
concerned with the requisite degree of fault. On one view, a state must take
"such measures as may be practicable under the circumstances" in order to
escape liability.' On another view, a state will be strictly liable unless it
can demonstrate that it had no knowledge of the activity in question!" For
our purposes, there is no need to resolve the issue because we are concerned
with deliberate environmental damage which will give rise to liability under
either view of the requisite state of mind.
D. Responsibility for Violations
The principles established in the Trial Smelter Case and the Stockholm
Declaration have their roots in the traditional regime of State Responsibility.
For example, the tribunal in the Trail Smelter Case said that "a state owes
at all times" a duty to prevent environmental damage, and "no state has the
right" to cause environmental damage.' Similarly, Article 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration provides that "states have. . . the responsibility to
ensure" that their activities do not cause environmental damage." The
general principle is specifically intended to protect states, can only be
violated by states and, by implication, cannot give rise to any individual
responsibility or punishment.
What, then, is the nature of a state's responsibility? Under customary
international law, a state which commits an "internationally wrongful act"
incurs "state responsibility" which can only be discharged by making
"reparation." The Permanent Court of International Justice has explained
that:
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this
is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in
place of it-such are theprinciples which should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.32
28. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (REVISED) pt. IV, ch. 1,
601(1).
29. I.L.C., supra note 14, draft Article 3.
30. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1911, 1965.
31. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at 1420.
32. The Factory at Chorzow, (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13,
1928).
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On traditional principles, only those states which are directly injured by the
wrongful conduct have jurisdiction to invoke the responsibility of the
offending state to pay compensation. During the last half-century, however,
two world wars and the technological revolution have dramatically changed
the shape of international relations and the traditional framework of state
responsibility has, in turn, undergone significant readjustment. In 1970, in
the Barcelona Traction Case,33 the International Court of Justice suggested
that certain obligations, called "erga omnes," affect the interests of all states
and hence any state (whether specifically injured or not) has jurisdiction to
invoke the responsibility of the offending state:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis
another State. By their very nature the former are the concern of all
States. In viewof the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes. 34
This view is reinforced by the ILC's Draft Convention on State Responsibility
which introduces in Article 19, the notion of an "international crime":
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State
of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a
crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an international crime.3"
Significantly, Article 19(3) expressly stipulates that: "an international
crime may result, inter alia, from . . . a serious breach of an international
obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of
the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the
atmosphere or of the seas..."'
However, the foregoing principles only demonstrate that a rule designed
to protect the environment is capable of amounting to an "international
crime" or "erga omnes." This does not mean that every rule pertaining to
environmental protection will necessarily be so classified. In fact, it is
extremely difficult to construe the particular principle established in the Trail
Smelter Case and codified in the Stockholm Declaration as one of "essential
importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human environ-
33. Barcelona Traction, Light, & Power Co. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Sp.), 1970 ICJ REP.
3 (Judgement of Feb. 5).
34. Id. at 32.
35. Draft Article 19(2), 1976 I.L.C. REP. 175. Some western states (including the United
States) rejected the Article as an unwise application of the notion of criminal responsibility, A/C
6/31/17 (1976). But it was generally agreed that "in the case of rules which protect the common
and fundamental interests of all states ... it is necessary to confer a right on any state
individually to prosecute a claim." Judge Arechaga, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 275 (1978-1).
36. Id. art. 19(3).
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ment."I" The principle is specifically designed to resolve interstate
disputes. The focus of concern is the injury inflicted upon a state's interest,
not the impact upon the interests of the international community at large.
Even the ILC's draft Articles only require the state of origin to "negotiate
with the affected state" to determine the legal consequences of the harm."
In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the principle developed in the
Trail Smelter Case and the Stockholm Declaration is not intended to protect
global interests, only state interests. Hence, only those states which suffer
environmental damage will be able to invoke the responsibility of the
offending state to make reparation.
E. The War Context
1. Applicability of the General Principle in Wartime
The Trail Smelter Case and the Stockholm Declaration which, together,
introduced the principle into customary international law, express the
prohibition in broad terms and do not in any way preclude its application in
the context of hostilities. This is reinforced by paragraph five of the World
Charter for Nature in which the United Nations General Assembly
(U.N.G.A.) overwhelmingly resolved that "nature shall be secured against
degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities."" As part of a
U.N.G.A. resolution, this provision is not inherently binding. It does,
however, constitute further evidence supporting of the applicability of the
general principle in wartime.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the ILC's draft Articles on "Internation-
al Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law" provides that "there shall be no liability... if the harm
was directly due to an act of war [or] hostilities."' However, this provi-
sion has no basis in customary international law and certainly does not
prejudice the wartime application of the principle established in the Trail
Smelter Case and Stockholm Declaration. Indeed, Article 5 of the draft
Articles expressly provides that "the present articles are without prejudice to
the operation of any other rule of international law."41
We therefore conclude that the general principle of state responsibility
for environmental damage is applicable in wartime.
37. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12.
38. I.L.C., supra note 14, draft Article 21.
39. The resolution was supported by over 100 states. The sole dissenting vote was cast by
the United States. G.A. Res. 37/7, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Do. A/RES/37/7
(1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 456 (1983).
40. I.L.C., supra note 14, at 171.
41. Id. art 5.
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2. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness
Even in the context of war, a state may be able to demonstrate the
existence of certain circumstances which preclude the wrongfulness of acts
which would otherwise be violations of the general principle. The "special
circumstances" most likely to be invoked by a state causing wartime
environmental damage are distress and necessity. It is important to
appreciate that self-defence is not a defence to a violation of the general
principle prohibiting environmental damage. It is only a defence to the use
of force.42 However, as will shortly be demonstrated, a state committing
wartime environmental damage must be doing so in the course of lawful
self-defence in order to assert a circumstance of distress or necessity.
(a) Distress. The nature of "distress" in customary international law is
codified in Article 32 of the ILC's Draft Convention on State Responsibili-
ty.' Under the Article, distress may only be invoked if the state had no
other means of saving the lives of persons entrusted to its care." Further-
more, distress may not be invoked if the state in question has contributed to
the occurrence of the situation of extreme distress, or if the conduct in
question was likely to create a comparable or greater peril.45 In the context
of war, this means that a state must at least be acting in lawful self-defence
and must satisfy the requirement of proportionality.'
(b) Necessity. The elements of "necessity" in customary international
law are codified in Article 33 of the ILC's Draft Convention.47 As in the
case of "distress," a state must be acting in lawful self-defence because
necessity may not be invoked if the state has contributed to the situation of
necessity.' Unlike the case of "distress," however, the state need not be
acting to save lives. It need only be safeguarding "an essential interest of the
state against a grave an imminent peril."49 At the same time, Article 33
imposes an upper limit on the amount of damage that may be inflicted by
stipulating that the act of necessity must not "seriously impair an essential
interest" of the victim state.'
42. The "use of force" is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, subject to exceptions
for self-defence (Article 51) and collective security authorized by the Security Council (Articles
39 and 42). Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993. This is discussed in
detail in Section III.
43. 1979 I.L.C. REP. 329.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. These concepts are discussed in detail in Sections III and IV.
47. 1980 I.L.C. REP. 69.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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F. Summary
The vast majority of wartime environmental damage will give rise to
state responsibility under the general principle derived from the Trail Smelter
Case and the Stockholm Declaration. The special circumstances precluding
wrongfulness could rarely be invoked because an offending state would be
required to demonstrate that:
(1) it caused the environmental damage in the course of lawful
self-defence; and
(2) environmental destruction was either:
(a) the only means of saving lives; or [distress]
(b) the only means of safeguarding an essential state interest, in
which case it must not seriously impair an essential interest
of the victim state. [Necessity]
However, the reality of modern armed conflict is such that the threat of
post-war financial obligations is not likely to deter states or their individual
representatives from engaging in environmental destruction during a war.
After all, the issues over which wars are fought, (particularly when each state
expects to be victorious), will invariably override any financial consider-
ations! The inevitable conclusion is that while the general principle of state
responsibility established in the Trail Smelter Case and codified in the
Stockholm Declaration is fully applicable to wartime environmental damage,
its primary role will be in the context of post-war reparations rather than as
a deterrent to the infliction of such damage during the course of war.
II. SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Overview
In this section we shall examine specific rules which build upon the
general principle of state responsibility for environmental damage in order
to address particular environmental concerns. Marine pollution has been the
subject of numerous treaties since World War Two, primarily due to the vast
expansion of maritime transport, accidental discharges from vessels and
coastal installations and the dumping at sea of an ever-expanding list of
noxious substances. Air pollution has also been a source of considerable
concern in recent years, as a result of increased awareness of the large-scale
climatic changes being caused by depletion of the ozone layer and the
"greenhouse effect." Most importantly for present purposes, hostile
environmental modification attracted particular international concern in the
1970s when it became apparent that future technology might enable countries
to induce volcanic eruptions, droughts, earthquakes and extreme weather
changes.
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B. Marine Pollution
1. Pre-1982 Conventions
Bearing in mind the fact that the numerous treaties on marine pollution
evolved in response to industrial accidents such as the discharges of the
Torrey Canyon in 1966, the Amoco Cadiz in 1978 and the Exon Valdez in
1989, it is not surprising that none of the treaties prior to 1982 have any
application to deliberate wartime marine pollution. The following examples
should suffice to illustrate this point:
(1) The 1954 London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil provides, in Article 19, that a government "in case
of war or other hostilities" is entitled to "suspend the operation of
the whole or any part of the present Convention." 51
(2) The 1969 Brussels Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties provides, in Article 2,
that "no measure shall be taken under the present convention
against any warship or other ship owned or operated by a state and
used for the time being, only on government non-commercial
service."52
(3) The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter prohibits the
dumping of waste, but defines "dumping" in Article 3(1) to
exclude "placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere
disposal thereof."53 In other words, dumping of waste for the
purpose of inflicting damage upon an enemy during war would not
be prohibited.
2. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
Part 12 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("LOS Convention") is devoted to protection of the marine environment and
is the most comprehensive attempt to address the issue to date.' Although
51. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T.
2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, 18.
52. Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,
brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 767-68.
53. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, 140.
54. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 1(4) U.N.
Doc. AICONF.62/122, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNTED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5
(1983).
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the convention is not yet in force,55 it is generally accepted that all the
provisions except those on deep sea-bed mining and dispute resolution
represent customary international law. As John Moore, Director of the
Centre for Oceans Law and Policy wrote in 1984:
Scholars presently differ on which portions of the Convention may now be
regarded as customary international law and thus binding law for all States,
whether or not party to the Convention. But there is significant support for
the proposition that all of the provisions of the Convention, with the
exception of those concerning deep sea-bed mining, are at least the best
evidence of customary international law in the absence of State practice to
the contrary.m
Turning to the substantive provisions, it must first be conceded that some of
the undesirable "old habits" have been reiterated in the LOS Convention.
"Dumping" is restrictively defined in Article 1(5) as excluding "placement
of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof." Furthermore,
under Article 236, any "warship, naval auxiliary, other vessel or aircraft
owned or operated by a state" is exempt from the provisions of the
convention.
Nevertheless, the LOS Convention prohibits a wide range of undesirable
marine activities, only a few of which involve "dumping" or "vessels." The
majority of provisions, therefore, do contribute to wartime environmental
protection. The relevant obligations may be summarized as follows:
(1) Under Article 194(1), states are broadly obligated to take "all
measures . . . necessary to prevent . . . pollution of the marine
environment from any source, using ... the best practicable
means at their disposal."
(2) Under Article 194(3), states are specifically obligated to "mini-
mize to the fullest possible extent":
(a) "the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, from land-based
sources, from or through the atmosphere," and;
(b) "pollution from ... installations and devices
operating in the marine environment."
Unfortunately, in contrast to the welcome enumeration of specific sources of
marine pollution giving rise to obligations of prevention, the convention has
made little progress in the area of responsibility. Article 235(1) simply
55. Id. In 1982 the convention was immediately signed by 119 nations. But it has not yet
received 60 ratifications as required by Article 308. Several developed nations including the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, did not sign due to
dissatisfaction with the Convention's deep sea-bed mining regime.
56. John Moore, Introduction to MYRON NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY xxviii (1985).
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incorporates the customary obligation to make reparation for violations of
international law:
States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They shall be liable in accordance with international law.
In Articles 207-212, states are directed to "adopt laws and regulations"
for the prevention of marine pollution from each of the enumerated sources.
Obviously, however, in a war situation perpetrators are not likely to be
concerned about the domestic laws of their enemy, nor would they have
reason to fear their own domestic laws while acting under government
orders. Even the right of coastal states to forcibly prevent pollution of their
coasts from marine casualties, under Article 221, would have little deterrent
effect during war because the polluting state would naturally expect
retaliation from its adversary.
In the end, the LOS Convention provides only a skeleton (albeit a good
one) for the future regulation of marine pollution by international law. The
only real contribution is the enumeration of specific sources of marine
pollution which states, pursuant to their general responsibility, are obligated
to prevent.
C. Air Pollution
A number of recently adopted treaties address the problems of transboundary
pollution and depletion of the ozone layer. The 1979 Geneva Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution provides, in Article 2, that "the
contracting parties ... shall endeavour to limit and, as far as possible,
gradually reduce and prevent air pollution. "'7 Similarly, Article 2 of the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer requires
parties to "take appropriate measures" for the protection of the ozone
layer.58
In practice, however, these conventions do not impose real restrictions
on deliberate wartime air pollution. First, the terminology is extremely
weak: states need only "endeavour" to limit air pollution "as far as
possible" and take "appropriate measures." Secondly, the provisions seem
to set out long-term objectives, rather than current obligations: parties must
"gradually reduce" air pollution. Thirdly, and most significantly, neither
convention imposes any liability or provides for responsibility.
The main purpose of these conventions, as indicated by most of their
articles, is to facilitate peacetime exchange of technical information,
57. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
10541, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
58. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22,
1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1988).
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monitoring of air pollutants and financing of research. "  They are not
intended to establish specific prohibitions on deliberate wartime air pollution.
D. Hostile Environmental Modification
1. The En-Mod Convention
Within the regime of International Environmental Law, the only
instrument which directly addresses the problem of deliberate wartime
environmental damage is the 1976 Geneva Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques.w The convention is currently binding on 55 states, including a
substantial proportion of those technologically advanced countries whose
cooperation would be necessary to effectuate the aims of the conven-
tion-United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany,
Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Yemen, India, Pakistan and others."
A number of States, including Iran, Iraq and Syria, have signed the
convention but have not yet ratified it. Although these States are not bound
by the terms of the treaty, they are probably bound by Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties2 which provides that: "a state
is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty when .. . it has signed the treaty .. . subject to ratification. " '
In other words, they must not act inconsistently with the convention's stated
objective of prohibiting "military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from
such use."' Of course, a violation of the Convention on the Law of Treaties
is not the same as a violation of the En-mod Convention itself. The scope
59. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 57; Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 58.
60. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 (banning the use
of techniques of environmental modification in war) [hereinafter En-Mod Convention]. The
convention was adopted by G.A. Res. 321/72, by a vote of 90 to 8 with 30 abstentions. It came
into effect on October 5, 1978.
61. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED wm THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31
DECEMBER 1989, at 836, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/8 (1990) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL
TREATIES].
62. Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), and in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The convention is the principal authoritative source of the law
of treaties. It is regarded as largely (but not entirely) declaratory of existing law, and on that
basis it has been invoked and applied by tribunals and by states even prior to its entry into force
and in regard to non-parties as well as parties.
63. Id. State practice suggests that Article 18 is part of customary international law. For
example, the United States and Soviet Union have both accused each other of violating the
unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 11). Indeed, in 1986, the President ordered
the elimination of two nuclear submarines in order to keep within the terms of the unratified
treaty.
64. En-Mod Convention, supra note 60, at 335.
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of state responsibility in this regard is likely to be in the nature of nominal
damages only.
2. The Central Obligation
Article 1 of the En-mod Convention sets out the central obligation in the
following terms: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party."' We shall
examine the various elements of the Article in turn.
(a) "military or any other hostile use." It is significant that, in
prohibiting "military or any other hostile use," the convention does not
distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of force.' Presumably, the
underlying policy is that hostile environmental modification poses such a
threat to mankind that it must be prohibited even in the course of lawful
self-defence or authorized collective security. This stands in contrast to the
general principle in the Trail Smelter Case and Stockholm Declaration, which
is subject to exception in circumstances of "necessity" or "distress."
(b) "environmental modification techniques." This term is defined in
Article 2 as: "any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipula-
tion of natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of
outer space."67 Although the definition is very broad and extends to every
sector of the global environment, it seems to be primarily concerned with
very large-scale environmental manipulation. This is reinforced by the
Understanding reached by the Conference of the Committee for Disarmament
and submitted to the General Assembly together with the convention.' The
Understanding on Article 2 sets forth the following illustrations of phenome-
non that might result from environmental modification:
earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region;
changes in weather patterns (clouds precipitation, cyclones of various types
and tornadic storms); changes in climate patterns, changes in the state of
the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere.'
(c) "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects." These terms describe
the requisite quantum of damage. They are phrased in the alternative so that
65. Id. art. 1.
66. Id.
67. Id. aft. 2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the existence of any one effect will invoke the prohibition. The problem
with these expressions is that there is no indication of how widespread or
how severe the damage must be. The Understanding accompanying Article
1 does define the terms as follows:
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometres;
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a
season;(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.'I
However, this interpretation does not represent a consensus of opinion and
is not part of customary international law. Some governments expressly
rejected these interpretations and criticized the vague terminology of the
convention. The Turkish Government, for example, made the following
Interpretive Statement when it signed the convention:
In the opinion of the Turkish Government the terms "widespread",
"long-lasting" and "severe effects" contained in the Convention need to be
clearly defined. So long as this clarification is not made the Government
of Turkey will be compelled to interret itself the terms in question and
consequently it reserves the right to do so as and when required.7
Even if the Understanding on Article 1 was widely accepted, it would be
open to criticism because the interpretation would subsume a large category
of environmentally hazardous weapons which should arguably be permissible
in certain circumstances during a war.' For present purposes, we may
conclude that the vague terminology significantly undermines the practical
value of the convention.
(d) "as the means of destruction, damage or injury." This phrase raises
the question of whether the offending state must have intended to cause the
exact damage that occurred, or need only have intended to cause some
damage. The former alternative would enable states to easily avoid the
convention by asserting that they did not intend to cause the amount or type
of damage that in fact occurred. The latter alternative, however, would
mean that states are responsible for excessive damage which they had no
intention of causing and no means of anticipating. It is submitted that states
should be responsible for any damage which they intended to cause and any
excess damage which was reasonably foreseeable.
70. Id.
71. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 61, at 836.
72. The terms are considered further in Section IV in relation to 1977 Protocol (I) Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (infra note 155), including a suggested interpretation
representing the maximum consensus of all states.
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3. Responsibility for Violations
Like all the other instruments of International Environmental Law, the
En-mod Convention only invokes the responsibility of states. Under Article
1, "each state party" undertakes not to engage in hostile environmental
modification against "other state parties."'
State responsibility under the convention, however, does not include any
obligation to make reparation or pay monetary compensation. Instead,
Article 5(2) obligates the U.N. General-Secretary to convene a Consultative
Committee of Experts at the unilateral request of any state. 4 The commit-
tee is required to assess the situation and present "a summary of its findings
of fact."75 The underlying rationale is that the committee's findings will
have a political impact and result in some "horizontal enforcement" by
encouraging the offending state to make reparation so as to re-establish its
credibility in the international community. However, this is somewhat
undermined by the fact that the committee is not authorized to draw legal
conclusions, to vote on "matters of substance" or to impose liability.
Indeed, in the context of war, international diplomacy has usually been
exhausted already and states are unlikely to be overly concerned about a
committee's report.
The convention provides two other "enforcement mechanisms" which
merit brief consideration. First, Article 4 directs states to enact domestic
legislation to enforce the convention in areas under their jurisdiction or
control.76 However, as explained in relation to the LOS Convention, this
mechanism is of very little use. Secondly, Article 5(3) entitles any state
party to "lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United
Nations."' If the Security Council decides that the complaining state "has
been harmed or is likely to be harmed," then every other state is obligated
to "provide or support assistance in accordance with the ... Charter of the
United Nations." In other words, the Security Council may act in accor-
dance with its powers under Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter.7"
In fact, this conferral of power upon the Security Council is both superfluous
and deceptive. The Security Council's powers under Chapter VI and VII
exist independently of any convention and does not require any express
conferral by particular conventions.' Under Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter, the Council's "Chapter VII" powers are conditional on the existence
73. En-Mod Convention, supra note 60, aft. 1.
74. Id. art. 5(2).
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 4.
77. Id. art. 5(3).
78. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, ch. VI & VII.
79. Id.
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of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. "I The
question is whether any of those conditions will be satisfied in the event of
an act of hostile environmental modification. This issue is examined in detail
in Section III of this article.
E. Summary
Our analysis in this section demonstrates that International Environmental
Law is not adequately equipped to deal with deliberate wartime environmen-
tal damage. Of all the numerous conventions on specific environmental
concerns, only two make any significant contribution to wartime environmen-
tal protection. The LOS Convention builds upon the general principle
discussed in Section I by listing specific sources of marine pollution which
states must avoid. The En-mod Convention directly prohibits large-scale
modification of the environment for military purposes.
Even these conventions, however, are problematic. The difficulties can
be summarized as follows:
(1) Deliberate wartime pollution by "dumping" or through the use of
"vessels," is exempt from the LOS Convention.
(2) The requisite quantum of damage under the En-mod Convention is
extremely uncertain because the expressions, "widespread, long-lasting
or severe," are capable of divergent interpretation.
(3) The reluctance of several important states (particularly Iraq, Iran and
Syria) to become parties to the En-mod Convention significantly
undermines its effectiveness and its ability to contribute to the progres-
sive development of customary international law.
(4) Most importantly, the responsibility provisions both under the LOS
Convention and the En-mod Convention are too weak to influence the
behavior of a state engaged in armed conflict. Neither the threat of
post-war financial obligations, nor the embarrassment of an adverse
report by a committee, is sufficient to deter a state from engaging in
environmental destruction during a war. Only the threat of post-war
individual criminal responsibility is likely to have an impact on the
servicemen and decision-makers who really constitute "the state."
80. Id. art. 39.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FORCE: THE "Jus AD BELLUM"
A. Overview
In this section, we shall examine the laws regulating the use of force per
se (the "jus ad bellum") with a view to their capacity to restrain environmen-
tal victimization. There are essentially four aspects within this regime which
require investigation.
First, we must consider the nature of the general prohibition on the use
of force, the breach of which at least gives rise to state responsibility to make
reparation.
Secondly, we shall examine the scope of the pre-conditions in the U.N.
Charter which govern the power of the Security Council to authorize
collective military operations.
Thirdly, we will analyze the nature of crimes against peace (specifically,
the crime of waging an aggressive war) which give rise to individual criminal
responsibility.81 Our concern is whether an otherwise non-aggressive war
can be rendered aggressive by virtue of environmental victimization.
Finally, we must remember that all the above sanctions only apply when
environmental damage is inflicted in the course of an unlawful use of force.
We must therefore briefly discuss the two main exceptions to the prohibition
on the use of force, namely, self-defence and authorized collective security.
Environmental damage inflicted in the course of either of these lawful uses
of force will not be restricted by the "jus ad bellum" regime.
B. Environmental Damage as a Prohibited
"Use of Force"
1. The Prohibition on the Use of Force
Until the early part of this century, war was still regarded as a lawful
instrument of national policy, a "natural function of the state and a
prerogative of its uncontrolled sovereignty."' However, after two world
wars and numerous unsuccessful attempts to outlaw war," the Charter of
the United Nations was set up "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind."" In Article 2(4), the Charter expressly prohibited not only war,
81. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945 and Oct. 6. 1945, 59 Stat. 1543, U.N.T.S. 280, 284.
82. 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
83. 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, reprinted in RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 978-89 (1958); Paris General Treaty for Renunciation of War
as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
84. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, preamble.
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but any "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."'
Over the years, it has been suggested that certain uses of inter-state force
do not violate "territorial integrity" or "political independence" and hence
would not be prohibited.' The overwhelming weight of authority,
however, regards Article 2(4) as an absolute prohibition, subject only to
collective security (Article 42) and self-defence (Article 51).7
It is now generally accepted that Article 2(4) not only corresponds to
customary international law, but "belongs to the realm of jus cogens. " 11
This means it is "a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm ... having the same charac-
ter. "'
2. Responsibility for Violations
A violation of the obligation in customary international law to refrain
from the threat or use of force constitutes an internationally wrongful act,
giving rise to state responsibility to make reparation. Reparation would
ordinarily consist of monetary compensation for all losses and injuries
suffered by the victim states and their nationals as a result of the unlawful
use of force.
The use of force, as such, does not give rise to any individual responsi-
bility or punishment because the obligation is imposed upon states."'
However, if the use of force amounts to the "waging of a war of aggres-
sion," it will constitute a "crime against peace" for which there is individual
criminal responsibility.9 At this stage it should be noted that "aggression"
appears to have acquired the character of "erga omnes," or "international
crimes," whereby every state (not just the immediate victim) is entitled to
invoke the responsibility of the aggressor to make reparation.'
85. Id. art. 2(4).
86. E.g., the use of force solely to vindicate a legal right or to provide humanitarian aid.
87. These exceptions are discussed in Part E of this section. Dinstein arrives at this
interpretation by reference to other provisions of the Charter, YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 86 (1988). Brownlie arrives at the same conclusion by
examining the Travaux Preparatoires of the Charter, IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 266-67 (1963). This interpretation is also implicit in the recent
judgement of the International Court in the Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 100.
88. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 153
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 42, at 698-99, art. 53.
90. Article 2(4), for example, provides that "all Members" shall refrain from the use of force.
Since membership of the United Nations is limited to states, only states are bound by the
obligation. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, art. 2(4).
91. We shall explore this possibility in section IIID of this section.
92. This characterization of aggression is directly supported by the Barcelona Traction Case,
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Ltd. (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v.
Spain) Second Phase, 1970, 46 I.L.R. 178, 206; and Article 19 of the Draft Articles, supra note
27, at 95.
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3. Environmental Damage as a "Use of Force"
The term "use of force" is not expressly defined in any international
legal instruments. Brierly asserts that Article 2(4) only prohibits the use of
"armed force" because this expression is used in the preamble of the
Charter.'e But this assertion appears to be unfounded. The historical
evolution of the prohibition on the use of force suggests that words such as
"armed," "military," "aggression" and "war" were purposely avoided in
Article 2(4) "because these terms lend themselves to circumvention." '
Indeed, Brownie comments that "the travaux preparatoires do not indicate
that the phrase applied only to armed force" and "there is no evidence either
in the discussions at San Francisco or in State or United Nations practice"
suggesting such a limited construction."
Given, then, that the "use of force" concept is wider than "armed
force," does it extend to the infliction of environmental damage? Brownie
stated in 1963 that "deliberate employment of natural forces by a state...
can probably be regarded as a use of force."' He suggests the "release of
large quantities of water down a valley" and "the spreading of fire through
a built up area or woodland across a frontier" as possible (albeit difficult)
examples.'
More compelling is the growing support for the recognition of "coercive
economic measures" as a "use of force." The Charter of the Organisation
of American States, for example, provides in Article 16 that "no state may
use. . . coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to
force the sovereign will of another state. "" Of course, customary interna-
tional law does not, at present, recognize economic coercion as a use of
force-such a claim by Iraq during the recent Persian Gulf Conflict was
firmly and universally rejected by the international community." Never-
theless, if international law is moving in the direction of recognizing
93. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 415 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
94. LOUIS HENKIN Er AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATmALS 677 (2nd ed. 1987).
95. BROWNUE, supra note 53, at 362.
96. Id. at 376.
97. Id. at 362-63.
98. 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. For similar resolutions, see Article 32 of the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31),
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); Declaration of the Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Co-operation among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28),
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs
of State and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
99. The concept of economic aggression was widely criticized as "liable to extend the concept
of aggression indefinitely," 7 U.N. GAOR Supp., No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/2211 at 58 (1952).
Economic coercion was excluded from the 1974 consensus. Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res.
3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp., No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
100. Television Documentary Program "Price of Peace: The Mother of all defeats,"
Melbourne, Australia, March 25, 1991, 8:30-10:30 p.m., Channel 10 (on file with author).
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economic coercion as "force," a fortiori the infliction of deliberate
environmental damage is likely to constitute a "use of force."
Further evidence in support of the characterization of environmental
damage as a "use of force" lies in Resolution 687 of the U.N. Security
Council (the "cease-fire" resolution in the Persian Gulf conflict). °10
Paragraph 16 of the resolution expressly "reaffirms that Iraq is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources ... as a result of Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."" 2 What is the legal basis
for this imposition of liability? At first, there might appear to be three
possibilities: (1) violation of the Stockholm principle prohibiting environ-
mental damage; (2) violation of the laws of warfare, or; (3) violation of the
prohibition on the use of force. On closer examination, however, the first
two possibilities may be dismissed because they have nothing to do with the
"lawfulness" of the invasion. The reference to "Iraq's unlawful invasion"
could only relate to the prohibition on the use of force which, under the
terms of paragraph 16, includes "environmental damage."
In the writer's view the prohibition in Article 2(4) deliberately employs
the broad term "force" in order to encompass any agency-including
environmental manipulation-which has an adverse physical impact upon
another state. It is the adverse physical impact, rather than the particular
agency employed, which invites a conclusion that force has been used. In
the case of economic coercion, an adverse physical impact is not always
readily apparent because it is difficult to objectively assess the impact of
economic pressure-hence the reluctance to recognize economic coercion as
a use of force. Environmental damage, however, whether caused by the
ignition of oil-well fires or by the pumping of oil into the sea, in itself
constitutes an extremely adverse physical impact-worthy of full recognition
as a use of force. This approach is consistent with the Oxford Dictionary's
definition of "force" as a "measurable and determinable influence, tending
to cause motion of a body."" °3 The core of this definition is an "influence
tending to cause motion"°-in other words, a "physical impact." The
qualifying criteria are that the influence or impact must be "measurable and
determinable" 1 -in other words, "objectively assessable."
Of course, not all environmental damage will amount to a use of force.
Just as "a few stray bullets across a boundary""° would not be regarded
as a violation of Article 2(4), small-scale environmental damage such as a
small transboundary bushfire would also escape the prohibition. The
101. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/22430 (1991).
12. Id.
103. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 382 (7th ed. 1982).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bengt Brams, The Definition of Aggression, (1977) 154 R.C.A.D.I. 299, 346.
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question of the requisite quantum of damage is no clearer here than it is in
relation to the International Environmental Law regime. The "agency"
theory which we developed above suggests that the damage must at least be
"measurable" or "objectively determinable." However, it is certainly clear
from Resolution 687 that severe damage, such as that inflicted on the
environment during the Persian Gulf Conflict, violates Article 2(4).
C. Environmental Damage as a "Threat to the Peace"
or "Breach of the Peace"
1. The Nature of Collective Security
The question of whether environmental damage can amount to a "threat
to the peace" or "breach of the peace" is important for our purposes because
the collective security mechanism in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is
triggered by the Security Council's determination that there exists any "threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."1°7 The process
commences with calls on the parties to comply with provisional mea-
sures," °1 then measures not involving the use of armed force such as the
"interruption of economic relations" or the "severance of diplomatic
relations,"°9 and finally, should the Security Council decide that these
measures are inadequate, it "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and securi-
ty."110
At this stage we shall only examine the scope of "threats to the peace"
and "breaches of the peace."'
2. Environmental Damage as a "Threat to the Peace"
or "Breach of the Peace"
Having established that environmental damage may constitute a "use of
force," it is appropriate to begin our investigation here by observing that
most authorities regard the term "threat to the peace" as even wider in scope
than "threat or use of force." R6ing explains that whereas "threat of force
is illegal," a "threat to the peace may be the consequence of legitimate
activities." 1 2 Broms similarly argues that "economic, ideological and
other like forms of aggression" which are not threats or uses of force "could
107. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, art. 39.
108. Id. art. 40.
109. Id. art. 41.
110. Id. art. 42.
111. Environmental damage as an "act of aggression" is considered in Part D.
112. B.V.A. R61ing, On Aggression, On International Criminal Law, On International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 2 NEDERIANDS TUDSCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 167, 173-74
(1955).
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be defined as acts falling within the framework of a threat to the peace or a
breach of the peace."" 3 Kelsen, in fact, provides a long list of "threats to
the peace" which would not amount to "threats or uses of force."" 4
Hence, we may confidently extend our previous finding that environmental
damage may amount to a "use of force" to a conclusion that environmental
damage may amount to a "threat to the peace" or "breach of the peace."
Alternatively, the characterization of environmental damage as a "threat
to the peace" or "breach of the peace" may be inferred even without
resorting to indirect argumentation about the scope of the "use of force"
concept. Dinstein states that Article 39 of the U.N. Charter gives the
Security Council "a carte blanche in evaluating any given situation . . .
Nowhere is the Council under less strictures than in its determination that a
threat to the peace exists."" 5 Kelsen takes this view one step further,
stating:
Since the Security Council is completely free in its determination of what
is a threat to the peace or breach of the peace, it may determine as such
any conduct of a state without regard to whether this conduct constitutes
the violation of an obligation stipulated by pre-existing law. By declaring
the conduct of a state to be a threat to, or breach of, the peace, the
Security Council may create new law." 6
In similar terms, Akehurst concludes that, realistically, "a threat to the peace
is whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace." 17 These
assertions are not sarcastic observations on United Nations practice, nor are
they cynical criticisms of Charter phraseology. They derive from the fact
that: "the Council is a political and not a judicial organ. It is composed of
Member States, and its decisions are (and have every right to be) linked to
political motivations that are not necessarily congruent with legal consider-
ations. "118
Clearly, there is no legal impediment to a determination by the Security
Council that acts of environmental damage constitute a "threat to the peace"
or a "breach of the peace." It will, in the end be a question of political will,
which in turn depends largely on the gravity of the damage and the perceived
threat to international peace and security. It is significant that, in the context
of the recent Persian Gulf Conflict, the commencement of the allied "ground
war" was reportedly triggered in part by growing evidence of the Iraqi troops
113. Broms, supra note 106, at 386-87.
114. E.g. "If a state refuses to execute the decision of the International Court of Justice,"
HANS KEiSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NAIONS 727-28 (1950).
115. DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 258.
116. KELSEN, supra note 114, at 736.
117. MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 181 (4th ed.
1982).
118. DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 258-59.
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sabotaging the Kuwaiti oil wells and inflicting environmental damage of
potentially global proportions.11 9
D. Environmental Damage as Aggression
1. Individual Responsibility for Crimes Against Peace
Whether environmental damage amounts to "aggression" is relevant in
two contexts. First, if the Security Council determines that the environmen-
tal damage constitutes an "act of aggression," it may authorize a collective
military response under Articles 39 and 42 of the U.N. Charter. 11°
Secondly, and of far greater significance, Article 6(a) of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the "Nuremberg Charter") 21
provided that the "planning, preparation initiation, or waging of a war of
aggression" is a "crime against peace" for which "there shall be individual
responsibility."" 2 Such responsibility was to consist of criminal sanctions
including where appropriate, capital punishment."z Furthermore, crimes
against peace were to attract universal jurisdiction whereby any state was
entitled to prosecute offenders subject only to the practical attainment of
custody. 2' At the time of the Nuremberg Trials, there was considerable
debate about whether the crime of aggressive war was part of customary
international law.", Today, however, there is no doubt that "the criminality
of aggressive war has entrenched itself in an impregnable position in
contemporary international law."" For present purposes, therefore, the
issue is whether acts of environmental damage performed during a war
qualify as "aggression" so as to render the war a "war of aggression."
2. Environmental Damage as "Aggression"
The term "aggression" has a long legal history dating back to the early
days of Greece."V However, it was not until 1974, after 20 years of
119. Television Documentary Program, supra note 100.
120. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, art. 39, 42. Of course, the Security Council's powers
are identical in the face of aggression, breach of the peace or any threat to the peace. Hence,
it is not imperative for the Council to determine specifically that aggression has been
perpetrated.
121. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (Nuremberg Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 284.
122. Id.
123. See id. art. 27.
124. See Article 6 of the London Agreement to which the Charter was annexed.
125. See Franz Schick, Crimes Against Peace, 38 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1948);Quincy The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947); George A. Finch, The
Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1947).
126. DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 188. See G.A. Res. 95(I); G.A.Res. 177(11).
127. See Broms, supra note 106, at 305-35.
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negotiations and submissions from representatives from 138 nations, that the
U.N. General Assembly was able to reach a consensus with the adoption of
Resolution 3314.1 The overwhelming majority of nations have accepted
the General Assembly's Definitioni" and at least one paragraph, namely
Article 3(g)'" has been held by the International Court of Justice in the
1986 Nicaragua Case to mirror customary international law.1"I At the
outset, therefore, "the essence of crimes against peace has to be extracted
from the General Assembly's formulation.""
The General Assembly's Definition contains both general and enumer-
ative elements. The general part is embodied in Article 1: "Aggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Defini-
tion."' 33
This is a repetition of the core wording of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter prohibiting the use of force, subject to several variations. The most
significant variation for present purposes is that the Definition refers to the
use of "armed force""3 whereas the U.N. Charter simply prohibits the use
of "force." 35 Having demonstrated that acts of environmental damage
may constitute a use of "force," may they also constitute a use of "armed
force?"
The natural starting point in answering this question, is the enumeration
of specific acts of aggression in Article 3 of the Definition. Sub-paragraph
(b), the second of the seven illustrations, includes "the use of any weapon by
a state against the territory of another state," as an act of aggression."
Can environmental manipulation be regarded as a "weapon"? As an initial
observation, it is worth recalling the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques.' Irrespective of the substance of the convention, its mere exis-
tence suggests that environmental modification was widely perceived as a
128. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp., No. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
129. Id. at 362-63.
130. Article 3(g) of the definition provides that the "sending . . .of armed bands ... which
carry out acts of force against another state [may] qualify as an act of aggression." G.A. Res.
3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
131. 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 103. Since Article 3(g) was the most indirect form of aggression
in the enumeration, it may be inferred by interpolation that "other portions of Article 3 may
equally be subsumed under the heading of true codification." DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 124.
132. DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 121.
133. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp., No. 31,
U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974).
134. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, ar. 2(4).
135. Id.
136. Id. art. 3(b).
137. En-Mod Convention, supra note 60, at 333.
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potential weapon of war. This argument is reinforced by the Explanatory
Note to Article 3(b), recording the unanimous agreement of the Special
Committee that the expression "any weapon," is intended to include
"conventional weapons," weapons of mass destruction and [significantly] any
other kind of weapon."13 Since environmental manipulation is capable of
causing at least as much damage as conventional weapons, and potentially as
much damage as weapons of mass destruction, it is submitted that environ-
mental warfare is exactly the type of new weapon which the framers of the
Definition of Aggression would have intended to be included by Article 3(b).
Nevertheless, if environmental manipulation cannot be regarded as a
"weapon," under Article 3(b) of the Definition, further investigation is still
merited because Article 4 states that "the acts enumerated [in Article 3] are
not exhaustive."139 To determine whether environmental manipulation
might fall within the general definition of aggression as a "use of armed
force," it is necessary to consider the underlying interest at the heart of the
concept of aggression which was to be protected by the criminalization of
"aggressive war." The first clue as to the nature of this interest is found in
the fifth preambular paragraph of the Definition: "Aggression is the most
serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, being fraught in the
conditions created by the existence of all types of weapons... with the Pos-
sible threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences. " "
Further insight is provided by an observation of George Finch in relation to
the Nuremberg Trials in 1947. Finch canvasses the various contemporary
views on the definition of aggression and comments that a good definition
would apply to weapons and other scientific instruments "the outlawry of
which is vitally necessary to safeguard not merely the future peace but
civilization itself."1 41 Finally, the following statement by Judge Biddle (the
American Judge on the Nuremberg Tribunal) in his report of the trial to
President Truman is of supreme intuitive value:
Aggressive war was once romantic; now it is criminal. For nations have
come to realise that it means the death not only of individual human
beings, but of whole nations, not only with defeat, but in the slow
degradation and decay of civilised life that follows that defeat. 142
The common thread running through all these sources is that the criminaliza-
tion of aggressive war was fundamentally designed to protect the welfare of
future generations of mankind. It was not intended to be limited to military
138. See paragraph 20 of the Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 9, U.N. Doc A/9619.
139. Definition of Aggression, ar. 4, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp.,
No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
140. Id.
141. Finch, supra note 125, at 36.
142. Report of Judge Francis Biddle to President Truman, Nov. 24, 1946, 15 Dep't St. Bull.,
No. 6, 954, 956.
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invasions and missile attacks. Rather, it extends to any conduct threatening
future civilization. It is indisputable in this context that environmental
damage is capable of threatening not only the welfare, but also the very
survival of future generations of mankind. This reality was most clearly
stated in the Commentary to the ILC's draft Articles on State Responsibility:
[Tihe astounding progress of modem science, although it has produced and
continues to produce marvellous achievements of great benefit to mankind,
nevertheless imparts a capacity to inflict kinds of damage which would be
fearfully destructive not only of man's potential for economic and social
development but also of his health and of the very possibility of survival
for the present and future generations. 43
In the final analysis, therefore, it is confidently submitted that acts of
environmental damage perpetrated during the course of a war are capable of
rendering that war aggressive, so as to attract individual penal responsibility.
Of course, much still depends on the magnitude of damage inflicted. The
comments made about the quantum of damage in relation to the use of force
are equally applicable here.
E. Lawfid Uses of Force
The most significant limitation on all the foregoing principles is that they
presuppose the illegitimacy of the resort to force in the first place. If
environmental damage is inflicted by a state in the course of a lawful use of
force, then it cannot amount to a prohibited "use of force," a "breach of
peace" or a "crime against peace." In such circumstances, even the most
severe acts of deliberate environmental destruction will escape liability under
the "jus ad bellum" regime.
We have already discussed one lawful use of force, namely, collective
military operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Articles
39 and 42 of the U.N. Charter. 1' The other main lawful use of force is
the right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 5
Under customary international law, states were entitled to use force in
self-defence where "the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelm-
ing, and leaving no choice of means, and no movement for delibera-
tion."'" When these criteria were present, a state was entitled to use force
even in anticipation of an armed attack. Article 51, however, provides that
"nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. " 147
143. 2 I.L.C. Y.B. 95, 108 (emphasis added).
144. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, arts. 39 & 42. See Part C of this section.
145. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, alt. 51.
146. Diplomatic note from U.S. Secretary of State, Danile Webster, to the British following
the Caroline incident in 1842. 2 MOORE DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
147. Id.
19921
29
Leibler: Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for Inter
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
96 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
There is much debate about whether Article 51 replaces or merely
reiterates the preexisting principle in customary international law. On one
hand, the phrase, "if an armed attack occurs" '" appears to preclude any
right of anticipatory self-defence and to that extent abolishes customary
international law. On the other hand, the reference to the "inherent right"
of self-defence suggests that the position at customary international law,
including the right of anticipatory self-defence, is preserved. This issue is
not yet settled and there are a number of eminent jurists and publicists on
both sides of the debate. 149
F. Summary
In this section we have demonstrated that deliberate wartime environ-
mental damage may constitute: (1) an illegal use of force, giving rise to state
responsibility to make reparation; (2) a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, for which the Security Council may authorize a
collective military response, and; (3) aggressive conduct sufficient to render
the war "aggressive," thus giving rise to individual criminal responsibility
for a "crime against peace."
These conclusions, however, are subject to two very important
qualifications. First, there remains considerable uncertainty as to the
minimum quantum of environmental damage necessary in order to invoke
each of the three consequences outlined above. We have suggested that the
damage should be measurable and objectively determinable. Secondly, none
of the principles in the "jus ad bellum" regime apply if the environmental
damage is perpetrated in the context of lawful self-defence or authorized
collective security.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WARFARE: THE "Jus IN BELLO"
A. Overview
In this section, we shall examine the numerous principles of the Law of
Warfare (the "jus in bello") with a view to their capacity to restrain
deliberate wartime environmental damage. The principles of the "jus in
bello" regime, in sharp contrast to those of the "jus ad bellum" regime
discussed in the previous section, apply irrespective of whether a war is
being waged illegally (in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter) or
legally (pursuant to Articles 42 or 51 of the U.N. Charter).
148. Id.
149. An excellent analysis of the Travaux Preparatoires of the U.N. Charter by Dr. Tim
McCormack firmly supports the existence of a right of anticipatory self-defence. See T.L.H.
MCCORMACK, ISRAEL'S BOMBING OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR AND SELF-DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Thesis, Law Library, Monash University, 1990) (on file with author).
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The modern Law of Warfare is the product of centuries of state practice
which gradually evolved into a body of customary international law." In
the latter half of the nineteenth century, men such as Henry Dunant, Francis
Lieber and Tsar Alexander II instigated a process of codification which
eventually led to the numerous Geneva and Hague conventions comprising
a substantial proportion of the modem rules of warfare. 1'
For present purposes, it is convenient to divide the rules of warfare into
two categories: (1) General principles of warfare which indirectly restrict
deliberate environmental destruction; and (2) Principles which directly
restrict deliberate destruction of the environment.
It should be noted that the ability of states to engage in deliberate
environmental destruction is further restrained by limitations on the use of
specific weapons. The use of land mines and incendiary weapons is
regulated by the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention. 52 First use of
chemical and biological weapons has been effectively outlawed by the 1925
Poisonous Weapons Protocol. 53  Even the use of indiscriminate nuclear
weapons is arguably illegal on general principles." In practice, however,
these rules do not significantly prevent deliberate environmental dam-
age-they merely reduce the variety of tools which may be employed for that
purpose. As such, further consideration of those rules is beyond the scope
of this article.
In the following sections, the two categories outlined above will be
examined in turn. We shall then consider the nature of the responsibility
which flows from violations of the laws of warfare.
B. General Principles of Warfare
At the heart of the "jus in bello" regime lies the fundamental proposition
that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
150. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman, ed. 1972).
151. Henry Dunant was caught up in the Battle of Solferino in 1859 and published an account
of his experiences under the title A Memory in Solferino. The booklet led to the establishment
of the International Red Cross in 1890 and the first Geneva Convention in 1964. Francis Lieber
drafted the first comprehensive Code of Land Warfare in 1863 during the American Civil War.
Tsar Alexander II convened the conference which produced the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration.
The latter two instruments laid the foundations for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
152. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons: Final Act, Oct. 10, 1980, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
1523, 1529-35 [hereinafter Weapons Conference].
153. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
655.
154. See, e.g., 1963 Shimoda Case, Ryuichi Shimoda et al. vs. The State, II THE LAW OF
WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1688 (Leon Friedman, ed. 1972).
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unlimited."' 55 From this broad underlying proposition, four principles of
somewhat lesser abstraction have evolved: (1) the requirement of military
necessity; (2) the requirement of proportionality; (3) the obligation not to
cause unnecessary suffering, and; (4) the obligation to distinguish between
military and civilian targets.
Each of these four principles will be examined individually, with a view
to their application to deliberate environmental damage. From this analysis
we shall attempt to build a "general theory of military necessity" which
encompasses all four principles and lends itself more easily to implementa-
tion.
1. Military Necessity
Every use of force in war must, as a minimum precondition, be
militarily necessary. Expressed in this way, however, the principle is
capable of divergent interpretation. At one extreme, "the doctrine of military
necessity would ... justify any act that helped bring about victory, even if
the act was not really necessary for victory. It would merely have to
help."" At the other extreme, the principle implies a "but-for" test, under
which it must be demonstrated that but for the act in question, victory could
not have been achieved.
The true meaning of military necessity lies somewhere in between these
extremes. However, the considerable uncertainty as to the requisite amount
of military advantage, will prevent the principle from operating in practice
as a deterrent. In the context of deliberate environmental damage, it will
invariably be arguable that there was some military advantage, however small
that advantage. Some have argued, for example, that the dropping of the
atom bomb on Japan during the Second World War-an act of vast human
and environmental devastation-was a "military necessity" to shorten the war
and to alleviate the "acute tension."57 The ignition of Kuwaiti oil wells
by the Iraqis during the recent Persian Gulf War was universally con-
demned-yet it has been argued that the oil fires provided a marginal military
gain by filling the sky with black smoke and temporarily obscuring the vision
of enemy planes."
155. Article 22 of the (Hague) Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Article 35(1)
of the 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, June 8, 1977, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. at 1408 [hereinafter Protocol (I)]; Weapons Conference, supra note 152, at 1524.
156. SHELDON M. COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGMENT 35 (1989).
157. INGRID DE'rER DELupis, THE LAW OF WAR 333-34 (1987).
158. Greg Hywood, Iraqi attack on oil fields in Kuwait puzzles strategists, FIN. REV., Jan. 23,
1991.
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2. Proportionality
Of course, even where a particular means of warfare satisfies the
requirement of military necessity, the harm done by military action must still
be in proportion to the military gain. The 1977 Geneva Protocol (1)
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 purports to codify, in Article
57(2)(a)(ii), the principle of proportionality, in customary international
law. The Articles provide that:
those who plan or decide upon an attack shall ... take all feasible
precautions m the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimising, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. '6
Under this Article, however, proportionality in the choice and use of
weapons is only required in relation to civilian targets.161 This means that
once a target is classified as yielding military gain, any means of warfare
may be employed against it without regard to proportionality. In the context
of deliberate environmental damage, such an interpretation is reckless and
carries sinister implications. For example, if an amphibious attack upon land
is likely, the coastal waters become a legitimate military target for the
purposes of self-defence. Under Article 57, since the waters are a military
target, no rule of proportionality applies and the Article would not be
violated even if billions of barrels of oil are pumped into the sea causing
long-term severe damage to the regional ecology, economy, water supply and
possibly the human inhabitants!
The better view is that the rule of proportionality applies in relation to
the target whether it is military or civilian. Even if the destruction of a
target satisfies the test of military necessity, excessive damage should be
prohibited. Indeed, this interpretation of the rule is supported by the
Handbook of the Law of War for Armed Forces published by the International
Red Cross Committee in 1987.162 In Rule 389, the Handbook states: "The
rule of proportionality shall be respected. An action is proportionate when
it does not cause. . . damage which is excessive in relation to the value of
the expected result of the whole military operation."" This statement
clearly expresses the requirement of proportionality without reference to the
nature of the target.
159. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted by the Conference
June 8, 1977, U.N. Doe. A.32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
160. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
161. Id.
162. F. DE MUUINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES (1987).
163. Id. at 92.
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3. Unnecessary Suffering
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 condemned the employment of
arms which "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render
their death inevitable." 1' This was reiterated in Article 23(e) of the
Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) in what was to
become a classical principle of customary international law: "It is especially
forbidden . . . to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering." 1" Prima facie, the use of the word "suffering"
suggests that the principle is concerned with unnecessary harm to persons,
excluding property damage or damage to the natural environment. However,
the authentic French text of Article 23(e) uses the words "propres a causer
des maux superflus" which are more accurately translated as "a nature to
cause superfluous injury."1" The significance of this wording for present
purposes is that the word "injury" is not limited to personal harm. It
includes property damage, environmental damage, or damage to any "thing"
as indicated by the following definition of "injury" in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary: "INJURY: ... the act or result of inflicting on
a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impair-
ment. "67
Significantly, the 1977 Protocol (1) Additional to the Geneva Convention
of 1949, in Article 35(2), and the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention, in
the Preamble, both prohibit the employment of weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause "superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.""
Notwithstanding the clear application of the principle to superfluous
environmental damage, most authorities question the practical utility of a
principle expressed in such general terms:
Taken on its face value, the provision is couched in such vague and
uncertain terms as to be barren of practical effects ... [T]he way States
have attempted to implement Article 23e, either in military manuals or in
the few cases where the rule was invoked, shows that no common consent
has ever evolved among States as to the actual normative value of the
principle., M
164. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Gramnmes Weight, signed in St. Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 Am. J.Int'l L. Supp.
95 (1907) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
165. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 154, art 23(e).
166. Id.
167. WEBsTER'S TIDI) NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1164 (17th ed. 1976).
168. Protocol (I), supra note 155; Weapons Conference, supra note 152.
169. ANTONIO CASSESE, MEANS OF WARFARE: THE TRADITIONALAND THE NEW LAW, THE
NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 162-63 (1979).
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Of course, in cases of extremely excessive injury, there is much less room
for dispute:
Article 23e as it stands now plays in practice a normative role ... in
extreme cases (such as cases where the cruel character of a weapon is so
manifest that nobody would deny it, or where evidence can be produced of
gross, repeated and large-scale violations of the principle)."7
In particular, as one author observes, "weapons which inevitably cause
unnecessary suffering are prohibited."'71 The use of oil-well fires by the
Iraqis during the recent Persian Gulf War (which threaten to adversely
impact the health of plant, animal and human life in the region for genera-
tions to come) constitutes a text-book example of an extreme case "where the
cruel character of a weapon is so manifest that nobody would deny it.""
4. Civilian Targets
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 first articulated the general
principle of customary international law whereby the only legitimate object
which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy." This principle clearly (albeit indirectly)
restricts the ability of waring parties to deliberately damage the natural
environment-but only to the extent that elements or regions of the natural
environment are not legitimate military targets.
The key concepts, "military targets" and "civilian targets" are by no
means easy to apply. The 1977 Geneva Protocol (1) Additional to the
General Conventions of 1949 contains detailed rules designed to clarify and
facilitate the application of these concepts. 74 Article 52(2) defines military
objectives, as:
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.'
This definition is significant because it confirms that an objective must yield
real and definite military gains in order to be classified as "military." 76
170. Id. at 163.
171. DELuPIs, supra note 157, at 136.
172. Id.
173. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 164, at 95. One hundred years later, on December
18, 1968, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 24444(XXII), stating that
"distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members
of the civilian population, to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible."
174. Protocol (I), supra note 155.
175. Id. art 52(2).
176. Id.
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Targets of nominal military value or arbitrarily labelled as "military" will not
be legitimate objectives. Besides this, however, the definition merely
replaces the vague notion of military objective, with equally vague expres-
sions such as "effective contribution to miliary action" and "definite military
advantage."" 7  As a result, the distinction between military and civilian
targets remains a question of degree.
The problem is addressed more tangibly in Article 51(4) which prohibits
"indiscriminate attacks." 1" "Indiscriminate attacks" are defined as "those
which are not directed against a specific miliary objective, or which employ
a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective."" 7 Article 51(5) then defines two types of attacks which "among
others" must be "considered indiscriminate:"
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as
a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing
a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."s
Although these provisions are also framed in terms of vague expressions
(such as "military objectives," "concentration of civilians," "incidental loss,"
"concrete and direct military advantage"),' they appear to clearly prohibit
techniques such as area bombardment and the use of "blind" weapons which
have wide or uncontrollable destructive power. Indeed, one might logically
speculate that these provisions clearly outlaw large-scale environmental
victimization such as the ignition of hundreds of oil-fires or the pumping of
billions of barrels of oil into the sea. Such techniques are inherently "blind"
and inflict untold devastation far beyond any military advantage.
Unfortunately, however, logical interpretation must take a back seat to
the numerous reservations or "suggested interpretations" recorded by states
upon concluding the Protocol. The United Kingdom delegation, for example,
stated that it considered that the definition of indiscriminate attacks given in
that paragraph "was not intended to mean that there were means or methods
of combat the use of which would involve an indiscriminate attack in all
circumstances."" Similar statements were made by the delegations of
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 51(4).
179. Id.
180. Id. at. 51(5).
181. Id.
182. MICHAEL BOTHE Er AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 306 n.23
(1982) (citing CDDH/SR. 41, at 29-30).
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Italy, " ' the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 and Canada."' These res-
ervations, together with the fact that the United States and other countries
have not even ratified the Protocol, lead to the inevitable conclusion that any
innovative contribution made by Article 51(4-5) is not part of customary
international law-and probably not even part of treaty law. Any residual
doubt is dispelled by the view expressed by many authorities that a violation
of the provisions depends upon the belligerent's subjective perception of the
likely effect of its attack:
Instead of establishing that the possible disproportion must be objective
(i.e. that the actual incidental damage of civilians must not be out of
proportion to the military advantage actually gained), the provision hinges
on how a belligerent perceives and anticipates the effect of its attack....
Thus, for instance, faced with a glaning disproportion of civilian loss to the
military advantage, a belligerent could claim that when he planned the at-
tack he did not expect or anticipate such a great disproportion.'"
5. A General Theory of Military Necessity
Under the four general principles outlined above, any employment of
environmentally hazardous methods must be justifiable by military necessity;
they must be proportionate to the desired military gain; they must not result
in superfluous injury; and they must impact specifically on military targets.
In practice, however, the inherent generality and vagueness with which these
Principles are expressed exposes them to divergent interpretations and
wholesale exploitation and avoidance. While it may well be possible in
hindsight to confidently identify violations of the principles, the vast
uncertainty of their content prevents them from operating as effective
deterrents during the course of battle.
However, notwithstanding the above remarks, we must consider the
position of a tribunal having jurisdiction over persons accused of violating
the general principles of warfare. Such a tribunal could not simply decline
to apply the laws on the grounds of uncertainty or vagueness. Rather, the
tribunal would be required to develop, by extrapolation from existing
customary international law, an objective process of analysis capable of
practical application.
In the writer's submission, it is possible to devise such a mechanism by
combining the four general principles into a common context as follows: (1)
We begin by taking the most lenient interpretation of "military necessity,"
namely, that a belligerent is entitled to take measures to achieve even the
183. CDDH/SR. 41, at 30, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPUCABLE IN ARMED CONFUCTS,
OFFIcIAL REcoRDs (1974-1977).
184. Id. annex, at 1.
185. Id. annex, at 4.
186. Cassese, supra note 169, at 175-76.
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smallest military gain; (2) We then superimpose upon the latter rule strict
conditions of "proportionality," namely, that the amount of damage caused
by the measures must not be greater in magnitude than the military gain
being sought; (3) We then use the remaining two general principles (relating
to "superfluous injury" and "civilian targets") in order to facilitate our
assessment of proportionality. In other words, if a substantial proportion of
the damage is unconnected to the military gain being sought (ie: is "superflu-
ous") or impacts upon innocent civilian targets, then proportionality has not
been satisfied; (4) Finally, with regard to the state of mind of the offender,
we must achieve a balance between imposing liability for totally unexpected
damage and imposing liability only for specifically intended damage. An
appropriate standard would be one of "reasonable expectation."
Since the term "military necessity" is often used to encompass all four
general principles, we shall refer to the latter process of analysis as our
"general theory of military necessity." The theory may be summarized as
follows:
(1) In selecting means and methods of warfare, a belligerent must reasonably
expect to obtain some military benefit, however small that benefit may be.
(2) The damage caused, however, must not be greater in magnitude than the
military gain being sought.
(3) Such disparity shall be presumed where there is evidence that:
(i) a substantial proportion of the total damage did not yield any
military benefit, or;
(ii) innocent civilians and civilian objects were more than inciden-
tal victims in terms of the proportion of the total damage inflicted
upon them.
(4) The disproportionate damage must have been intended or reasonably
expected to result from the implementation of the particular means or
methods of warfare.
The underlying philosophy of this general theory which, in the writer's
submission, is consistent with customary international law, is that a
belligerent should retain the right to pursue even the smallest military gain
provided that the damage inflicted is proportionate to the size of that gain.
Furthermore, the general theory facilitates the assessment of proportionality
by reference to the relative amount of damage which does not produce
military gains or which impacts upon innocent civilian targets. Essentially,
the lawfulness of a particular method of warfare depends on whether the
overwhelming proportion of the reasonably expected damage, measurably
contributes to the achievement of the desired military goal.
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However, having arrived at this general theory, we must not lose sight
of the fact that it does not absolutely or even specifically prohibit environ-
mental damage per se. It only prohibits excessive environmental damage.
In the context of the Gulf Conflict, for example, any Iraqi liability under
these principles in relation to the oil spill or oilwell fires would be limited to
that part of the environmental damage which was disproportionate in relation
to the military gain.
C. Direct Limitations on Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage
The general principles of warfare indirectly and unwittingly contribute
to wartime environmental protection. Since the upsurge of specific
environmental concerns in the 1970s, however, international law has come
to regard environmental protection as a distinct goal of the law of warfare.
The protection conferred by the relevant laws extends to "property," to
"objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," to "works
and installations containing dangerous forces" and to the "natural envi-
ronment" in general. Each of these will be considered in turn.
1. Protection of property
Throughout the history of warfare, various tactics of scorched earth, and
crop destruction have caused serious local environmental harm. Hence,
Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided that "it is especially
forbidden ... to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war. 187
The deficiencies of this provision are immediately apparent from the
expression, "property" and from the qualification, "unless demanded by the
necessities of war."' 88
With regard to "property" it is not difficult to envisage forms of
environmental damage such as weather modification, atmospheric pollution
or ozone depletion which do not fit comfortably within the notion of
"destruction of property." Domestic legal systems have always found it
difficult to formulate a definition of "property." Osborn's Concise Law
Dictionary defines property as "that which is capable of ownership; also used
as meaning a right of ownership, as "the property in the goods. " ' From
this it seems that "property" describes the relationship between an object and
its owner, or, more generally, between a proprietary interest and the interest-
holder. On this basis, objects such as the climate, the atmosphere, the sea
187. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 155, art. 23(g).
188. Id.
189. OSBORN'S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY 268 (6th ed. 1976).
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and marine life, which are not capable of being the objects of such a
"proprietary relationship," could not be characterized as "property."" 9
Of paramount concern is the exception in the case of destruction
"demanded by the necessities of war," which introduces the recurrent
problem of uncertainty. As Falk observes, "such judgements of necessity are
difficult to second-guess; hence the regulatory effects are likely to be
modest." "I Of course, the problem might be resolved by reference to our
"general theory of military necessity" as developed in an earlier section. But
this or any similar process of analysis has not found expression in any of the
conventions and, as such, carries little value as a deterrent.
Notwithstanding these reservations, the provision does effectively
prohibit extreme damage which is clearly beyond the necessities of war and
which impacts upon recognized items of "property" such as forests,
farmland, vegetation, crops and livestock. In fact, this prohibition was the
basis for charges of war crimes against ten German civilian administrators
of Polish forests during World War Two. Nine of these Germans were
accused of war crimes by the United Nations War Crimes Commission at
Nuremberg because of their implementation of a Nazi policy "of ruthless
exploitation of Polish forestry" which involved "the wholesale cutting of
Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to preserve the
timber resources of the country." 192
The principle was reiterated in Article 53 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in lime of War as
follows: "Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal
property.. . is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered abso-
lutely necessary by military operations."" Unfortunately, this provision
incorporates all the defects present in the Hague provision and adds to them
a further limitation on the scope of the prohibition. By the words "occupy-
ing power," the convention confines its protection to property located in
occupied territory. In other words, if an air-force bombs factories in an
enemy country, such destruction is not covered by Article 53. Only if the
enemy power occupies the territory where the factories are situated will such
destruction be prohibited-and only to the extent that such destruction is not
necessitated by military operations.
190. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERs L. REV. 357 (1954).
191. Richard A. Falk, Environmental Disruption by Military Means and International Law,
in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE 37 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1984).
192. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948).
193. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 322.
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2. Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival
of the Civilian Population
Protocol I of 1977 contains in Article 54, a non-exhaustive list of
"objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population" which shall
not be "attacked, destroyed, removed or rendered useless." 1"' Examples
of these objects are "foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works. " "'
At first sight, this provision appears to confer an admirably high level
of protection upon a number of environmental targets. However, on
examining the detailed qualifications and exceptions embodied in subsequent
paragraphs of Article 54, it becomes clear that the provision adds very little
to the pre-existing restrictions on destruction of property.
First, it is only prohibited to destroy the objects to which Article 54
applies "for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value
to the civilian population." 1" This means that the objects may lawfully be
destroyed for purposes other than depriving civilians of their sustenance
value. Such legitimate purposes would include destruction to prevent their
use as cover, destruction to clear an area for fire or destruction to frustrate
an advancing enemy."
Secondly, since the provision is only concerned with the civilian
population, the objects may lawfully be destroyed for the specific purpose of
depriving the enemy of their sustenance value, if they could be used by the
enemy "as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces" or
otherwise "in direct support of military action." '
Thirdly, even if the relevant objects are destroyed for the specific
purpose of depriving the civilian population of sustenance, such destruction
is lawful if carried out by a state "in the defence of its national territory
against invasion ... where required by imperative military necessity. " "
Essentially, destruction undertaken for any purpose other than to deprive
civilians of food is effectively regarded as militarily necessary (or at least it
is not prohibited by this provision). The inevitable conclusion is that - at
least from the perspective of environmental protection - Article 54 is of
negligible utility.
194. Protocol (I), supra note 155, art. 54.
195. Id. art. 54(2).
196. Id.
197. These illustrations were given in the Report of Committee III at the Diplomatic
Conference of 1974-1977. BOTHE, supra note 182, at 339-40.
198. Protocol (I) supra note 155, art. 54(3).
199. Id. art. 54(5).
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3. Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces
In contrast to the very modest (at times, negligible) protection conferred
upon environmental targets by the foregoing provisions, Article 56 of 1977
Protocol I provides a particularly high level of protection for "dams, dykes
and nuclear electrical generating stations" and "military objectives located at
or in the vicinity of these works or installations."" Such objects "shall
not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objec-
tives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-
quent severe losses among the civilian population.""
Unlike the previous provisions, the exceptions in Article 56 are discrete,
specific and leave minimal scope for divergent interpretation. The objects
to which Article 56 applies may only be attacked if: (1) they are used "in
regular, significant, and direct support of military operations,"' and (2)
the attack is "the only feasible way to terminate such support."' In the
case of a dam or dyke, a third condition must be satisfied-it must be used
by the enemy "for other than its normal function."'
The specificity and detail of these exceptions ensures that-unlike most
of the provisions discussed earlier-they do not significantly undermine the
central prohibition. As the Report of Committee III emphasized, protection
"would exist unless the military reasons for destruction in a particular case
were of an extraordinary vital sort."'
Consider, for example, the case of a dyke which has the "normal
function" of holding back water. As long as the dyke serves no other
purpose, it will not lose its protection. But even if the dyke carries a main
road and thus has an important traffic function which may at first sight even
seem to preponderate over its "normal" function, this does not result in a
loss of protection, not even if the traffic includes occasional military
transport. The special protection ceases only if the traffic is "in regular,
significant and direct support of military operations" and "attack is the only
feasible way to terminate such support" !"
Without limiting the substantial achievements of Article 56 as outlined
above, two qualifying remarks are necessary in order to place the article in
proper perspective.
First, the protection conferred by Article 56 is limited to a specific list
of environmentally precarious targets, namely dams, dykes, nuclear electrical
generating stations and military objectives in the vicinity of these works.
200. Id. art. 56(1).
201. Id.
202. Id. arts. 56(2)(a), (b) & (c).
203. Id.
204. Id. art. 56(2)(a).
205. BOTHE, supra note 182, at 352.
206. Protocol (I), supra note 155, art. 56.
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The article has no bearing on other dangerous installations, such as oil wells
and oil pumping stations, which have demonstrated their destructive capacity
during the Gulf Conflict.
Secondly, it must be remembered that the innovative rules embodied in
Article 56 are not (at present) incorporated into customary international law.
Such incorporation must await evidence of the "constant and uniform
practice" of states abiding by the prohibition and accepting it "as law."'
At present, the reluctance of a number of important states to become parties
to Protocol 1,1 combined with incidents of attacks on nuclear facilities
during recent conflicts,' are frustrating the entrance of Article 56 into
customary international law.
4. General Protection of the Natural Environment
After the Vietnam War and particularly the United States' use of the
defoliant Agents Orange and Blue, the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977
decided to take up the challenge of general wartime environmental protec-
tion. This gave rise to Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of 1977 Protocol I, which
are expressed in almost identical terms.21 Article 35(3) provides "It is
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment." Article 55(1) similarly states:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.'
Perhaps the first noticeable feature of these provisions is the welcome
absence of any reference to "military necessity." Indeed, all the qualifica-
tions are expressed in terms of the nature of the damage. The existence of
any military value, advantage or imperative is irrelevant to the operation of
these articles.
207. The expressions "constant and uniform practice" and "accepted as law" appear in almost
every case in which a court or tribunal has been required to determine the existence of a custom.
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Case of the S.S. Lotus, France v.
Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; Asylum Case, Colombia v. Peru 1950 I.C.J. 266; The
Right of Passage Case, Portugal v. India 1960 I.C.J. 6.
208. There are 62 signatory states to Protocol I and to date, 78 states have ratified or acceded
to the Protocol. However, this does not include any major Western, former Soviet Bloc or
Middle Eastern state.
209. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980's, for example, the Iraqi airforce reportedly bombed
an Iranian nuclear power station. Fortunately, the nuclear fuel rods were not in place at the time
of the raid. H. McCouBREY, INTERNAnONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 118 (1990).
210. Protocol (I), supra note 155, arts. 35(3) and 55(1).
211. Id. art. 55(1).
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The second noticeable characteristic is the striking similarity to
Article l(1) of the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (the "En-mod
Convention").2 2 The Convention and the Protocol are not, however,
identical and it is important to appreciate three particular differences:
(1) The Convention prohibits acts which have "widespread, long-lasting or
severe" 213 effects, while the Protocol prohibits acts which have "wide-
spread, long-term and severe" effects.214 This means that under the
Convention, any one of the described effects separately is prohibited, but
under the Protocol they must be cumulative.
(2) Under the Convention, environmental modification must be carried out
"as the means" of destruction or damage. 21" The Protocol, however,
prohibits methods which "may be expected" to cause damage.2 6 In
other words, the prohibition in the Convention is directed at deliberate
environmental damage only, whereas the Protocol extends to objectively
foreseeable collateral effects.
(3) The Convention was created within the framework of International
Environmental Law, whereas the Protocol is part of the Law of Warfare.
This is a critical distinction (as will be demonstrated in the next section)
because responsibility under the Law of Warfare entails far more severe
consequences than it does under International Environmental Law.
With the foregoing preliminary observations in mind, we may now turn to
the central elements of Articles 35(3) and 55(1). In order to attract the
prohibition, the environmental damage, must be "widespread, long-term and
severe. "217 Initially, one is tempted to refer to the definitions of these
terms which were incorporated in the Understanding associated with the En-
mod Convention. 21s However, the Understanding expressly states that it
was "intended exclusively for this [the En-mod] Convention and is not
intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used
in connection with any other international agreement. "219 Furthermore, a
substantial number of states lodged reservations to the Protocol, stating their
212. En-Mod Convention, supra note 60, at 333; see Section I(D).
213. Id.
214. Protocol (I), supra note 155.
215. En-Mod Convention, supra note 60.
216. Protocol (I), supra note 155.
217. Id. art. 55(1).
218. See Section I(D).
219. Arms Control and Disarmament, 1978 DIGEST § 7, at 1673.
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understanding that the scope of the adjectives used in the Protocol was
different from the scope of the terms in the convention.2 °
In the Report of Committee III, only the element of duration ("long-
term") was explained. This element:
was considered by some to be measured in decades. Reference to twenty
or thirty years was made by some representatives as being a minimum.
Others referred to battlefield destruction in France in the First World War
as being outside the scope of the prohibition ... It appeared to be a
widely shared assumption that battlefield damage incidental to conventional
warfare would not normally be proscribed by this provision."
The most that can reasonably be derived from this so-called "explanation"
is that the articles are intended to prohibit extreme environmental damage,
and are not concerned with incidental or minor environmental damage. In
essence, this "explanation" is no more enlightening than the terms them-
selves. France actually refused to accede to Protocol I because of "the lack
of consensus among the signatory states.., as to the exact meaning of the
obligations they have undertaken."'
Of course, if an alleged breach of Article 35(3) or 55(1) was brought
before a tribunal with appropriate jurisdiction, the tribunal would be required
to interpret the phrase "widespread, long-term and severe," as prescribing
the minimum quantum of damage capable of attracting international
consensus. Such an interpretation might well resemble the following:
(1) "Widespread:" encompassing at least an entire region of several
hundred square kilometres;
(2) "Long-term:" lasting for at least several decades;
(3) "Severe:" causing death, ill-health or loss of sustenance to thousands of
people, at present or in the future.
Although this interpretation leaves very little scope for application, any
broader interpretation could not be said to reflect international consensus.
Whatever the exact meaning of these Articles, it is unlikely that they
apply to any major Western, former Soviet Bloc or Middle-Eastern state
since none of them are parties to the Protocol. One writer has expressed the
view that Article 55 "seems to incorporate the minimum current consensus
of international law on military activities in relation to the natural environ-
220. These states included Mexico, Peru, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, United
Kingdom, Venezuela, Italy, Argentina, Australia, Byelo-russia, France, Hungary, Qatar. BOTHE,
supra note 182, at 343-44.
221. CDDH/215/Rev. 1, para. 27, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS,
OFFIcIAL REcoRDs (1974-1977)..
222. DocuMENTs ON THE LAWS OF WAR 464-65 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d
ed. 1989).
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ment." I However, it is difficult to understand how a provision could
represent a norm of customary international law when there is such extensive
disagreement about the meaning of its central elements. Indeed, when the
Preamble to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention recalled "that it is
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment,"2  France lodged a reservation stating that this
paragraph "reproduces the provisions of Article 35, paragraph 3 of Addi-
tional Protocol I," and "applies only to States parties to that Protocol."'
D. Responsibility for Violations
The Law of Warfare derives much of its strength from the fact that
violations give rise not only to state responsibility to make reparation, but
also to individual criminal responsibility.
State Responsibility for violations of the laws of warfare is no more than
an application of the general principle of State Responsibility for international
wrongs. 6 The relevant principles have already been examined in relation
to the Stockholm principle 7 and the use of force' and it should suffice
to recall our conclusion that monetary compensation is inadequate both for
the purpose of deterrence and as a means of redressing deliberate environ-
mental victimization.
In this section we shall examine the nature of individual responsibility
for violations of the laws of warfare. We shall also consider the practical
effectiveness of the relevant principles.
1. Individual Responsibility
(a) The Nuremberg Principles. The first substantial development of
detailed principles in the field of individual responsibility, came with the
Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
following World War Two.' 9  The principles established at Nuremberg
can be summarized as follows.
First, all violations of the laws of warfare constitute "war crimes" for
which there is individual responsibility.' As Article 6(b) of the Nurem-
223. Falk, supra note 127, at 39.
224. Weapons Conference, supra note 152, at 1524.
225. Roberts & Guclff, supra note 222, at 488.
226. State Responsibility to pay compensation for violations of the laws of warfare is expressly
codified in Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and Article 91 of 1977 Protocol I.
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 222.
227. See section I.
228. See section II.
229. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 121.
230. Id. art. 6(b).
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berg Charter provided: "The following acts, or any of them, are crimes
... for which there shall be individual responsibility... War Crimes:
namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. . . The Charter
provided a list of such crimes, which led some writers to suggest that not all
violations of the laws of war constitute "war crimes."32 However, this
view is inconsistent with the express statement in Article 6(b) that war crimes
"shall include, but not be limited to" the violations specifically listed. 33
In any event, it was a pre-existing principle of customary international law
that violations of the laws of warfare give rise to individual criminal
responsibility. Hence, whether or not all such violations are termed "war
crimes" is purely a matter of semantics.'
Secondly, individual responsibility is not confined to those who
personally commit war crimes. Article 6 extends culpability to "leaders,
organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan." 35 This is reinforced by Article 7 which
provides that "the official position of defendants whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered
as freeing them from responsibilities. "
Thirdly, individuals convicted of war crimes are subject to criminal
punishment ranging from fines and imprisonment to capital punishment. 37
This is clearly evident from Article 27 of the Charter which entitled the
Tribunal "to impose upon a Defendant, on conviction, death or such other
punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.""
Fourthly, Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter conclusively rejected the
plea of "superior orders" as a defence to the commission of war crimes,
except as a mitigating factor with regard to punishment.' Even as a
mitigating factor, it would seem that the obedient solider must be able to
demonstrate that he was acting under extreme duress. In the Einsatzgruppen
Case, for example, the Tribunal held:
231. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 82, art. 6(b).
232. See, e.g., Yves Sandoz, Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, 1 INT'L CRIM.
LAW 209, 224-26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
233. Id. art. 6(b).
234. Note that "crimes against humanity" are war crimes of a particularly abhorrent nature
such as genocide, slavery, extermination and "other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population." Id. art. 6(c) They are classified separately in Article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter because, unlike the war crimes in Article 6(b), they are not confined to
actions against enemy targets, or to actions during wartime. To the extent that deliberate
wartime environmental damage is a violation of the laws of warfare, it will constitute a "war
crime" giving rise to individual responsibility. Whether or not it also constitutes a "crime
against humanity" does not affect the consequences. It is again a matter or semantics only, and
hence shall not be explored in this article.
235. Id. art. 6.
236. Id. art. 7.
237. Id. art. 27.
238. Id.
239. Id. art. 8.
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If one claims duress in the execution of an illegal order it must be shown
that the harm caused by obeying the illegal order is not disproportionately
greater than the harm which would result from not obeying the illegal
order. It would not be an adequate excuse, for example, if a subordinate
under orders killed a person known to be innocent, because by not obeying
it he himself would risk a few days of confinement.'
Finally, war crimes give rise to "universal jurisdiction" entitling any state to
take action against the defaulting individuals. 1  Papadatos explains the
nature of the universality principle as follows:
It is well known that this principle grants a state the right to punish a crime
which is a violation of the norms of the law of nations, regardless of the
place in which the deed was committed or of the nationality of the accused
person or of the victim; the jurisdiction which it sets up is that of the
forum deprehensionis, i.e., of that state on whose territory the defendant
has been arrested.' 4
The status of the "Nuremberg principles" as norms of customary internation-
al law was confirmed by the U.N. General Assembly on 11 December 1946
with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 95(I) affirming "the principles of
international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the judgement of the Tribunal."'
(b) The System of "Grave Breaches." A significant limitation on the
Nuremberg principles was that they regarded the prosecution of war
criminals as "an exercise of the right of self-help enjoyed by states as part
of their sovereignty. "24 States were entitled to invoke the individual
responsibility of war criminals, but were not obligated to do so.'
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 partly rectified the situation by
identifying certain violations as "grave breaches" for which states undertook
the following obligations: (1) to enact legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for any person committing or ordering to be
committed any of the "grave breaches," and; (2) to search for such persons
and to bring them to trial before "its own courts," irrespective of their
nationality.' Each state may also, if it so prefers, "under its own
legislation, hand such persons over to another state party which has made out
240. United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIAS OF WAR CRIMINALS 471 (USGPO, 1950) (the
Einsatzgruppen were SS death squads engaged in genocide.)
241. 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 53.
242. PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMAN TRIAL 44 (1964).
243. G.A. Res. 95(I), 1(2) R.G.A. 188 (1946).
244. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Implementation and Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and of the Two Additional Protocols of 1977, 164 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 37 (1979).
245. Id.
246. See Articles 49/50/129/146 of Geneva Conventions I to IV of 1949, respectively. 75
U.N.T.S. at 62, 116, 76 U.N.T.S. at 236, 386.
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a prima facie case." 7 For those war crimes which do not constitute
"grave breaches," the Conventions do not impose specific obligations but
simply require states to "take measures necessary for the suppression of"
such infractions.' It is clear, however, that "all breaches of the Conven-
tion should be repressed by national legislation.-'4
In view of the distinction between "grave breaches" (which must be
prosecuted) and other violations (which may be prosecuted), some further
examination of the laws of warfare pertaining to deliberate environmental
victimization is warranted.
Beginning with the general principles of the law of warfare, it emerges
that only the obligation to distinguish between military and civilian targets
gives rise to a "grave breach" upon violation.' This is derived from
Article 85(3)(b) of 1977 Protocol I which identifies as a "grave breach"
"launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects." z ' Two qualifica-
tions are required here. First, under Article 85(3) the act must have been
committed "wilfully" and must actually cause "death or serious injury to
body or health," in order to qualify as a "grave breach." 2 Secondly, only
those states which have ratified or acceded to Protocol I are bound to treat
such conduct as a "grave breach," thus excluding most major Western,
former Soviet Bloc and Middle Eastern countries.
Turning to the laws which directly restrict deliberate environmental
damage, two specific laws are identified in the relevant instruments as giving
rise to "grave breaches" upon violation. First, under common Articles
50/51/130/147 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 respectively, "grave
breaches" expressly include: "extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly."
Secondly, under Article 85(3)(c) of 1977 Protocol I, "grave breaches"
include: "launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such an attack will cause excessive
loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects." z3  Once
again, this latter provision is subject to the two qualifications described above
in the context of Article 85(3)(b).'
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 594 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958).
250. Protocol (I), supra note 155, art. 85(3)(b).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Protocol (I), supra note 155, art. 85(3)(b).
254. Common Articles 49/50/129/146 of Geneva Conventions I to IV of 1949, respectively,
supra note 246.
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The foregoing analysis reveals that most of the restrictions on deliberate
environmental damage do not give rise to "grave breaches" upon violation.
Consequently, states are only required to "take measures necessary for the
suppression" of such conduct. 5  The measures may include prosecution
of offenders and imposition of penal sanctions, but this is not mandatory.
2. Practical Considerations
The effective practical operation of the laws of warfare depends not only
on their substance, but on the existence of an international political climate
conducive to their implementation. Since the numerous war crimes trials
following World War Two, there has been no shortage of wars and no
shortage of war crimes-yet there have been virtually no attempts to invoke
individual responsibility for such violations. Part of the problem is that, in
the absence of a total defeat, fear of vengeful counter-trials operates as a
powerful disincentive.' Other difficulties include evidentiary complica-
tions, 7 extradition controversies' 8 and the inevitable stigma of "victor's
justice."'
On the other hand, there is a strong argument that the very existence of
a system of individual criminal responsibility, even if it is rarely implement-
ed, produces a measure of respect for the laws of warfare. Kalshoven argues
that:
the most important effect of individual criminal liability for violations of
the law of warfare is conceived as lying not so much in the actual
punishment as in the threat of such punishment. This threat, it is thought,
may provide an additional incentive to respect the law in situations where
the individual's moral sense might provide insufficient guidance.'
Certainly, "international law, and no less the law of war, relies heavily upon
meta-legal forces for its implementation. Part of those forces reside in the
nature of man and his awareness of his place in the universe." 1 Howev-
er, if we must rely on such "meta-legal forces," then we should also be
concerned by Draper's warning that "failure to secure the implementation
255. Id.
256. Draper, supra note 244, at 40.
257. See, e.g., In Re Yumashita (1946) 66 S.C. 340; Quincy Wright, Editorial Comment, Due
Process and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 406 (1946).
258. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Modern Pattern of War Criminality, 6 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1976).
259. See, e.g., CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS
IN WAR 141 (Richard A. Falk et al., eds. 1971).
260. FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 119 (1973).
261. Draper, supra note 244, at 9-10.
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and enforcement of the modem humanitarian law of war will do little to
maintain the faith of man in man." 262
E. Summary
In general terms, we may conclude that many instances of deliberate
wartime environmental damage are prohibited either directly or indirectly by
the laws of warfare. The general principles of warfare and, in particular, the
"general theory of military necessity" which we extracted from customary
international law, prohibit environmental damage to the extent that the
damage does not proportionately contribute to the attainment of a military
gain. More specific rules directly protect the environment by prohibiting
unnecessary destruction of property and objects indispensable to survival,
restricting attacks on installations containing dangerous forces and outlawing
modes of warfare which cause widespread, long-term and severe environ-
mental damage. Violations of these rules all constitute "war crimes," over
which there is universal jurisdiction entitling every state to try and punish
offenders. Some war crimes, such as wanton destruction of property, also
constitute "grave breaches" for which states are obligated to bring offenders
to trial.
However, notwithstanding the existence of all these rules, their practical
effectiveness is significantly undermined by the uncertainty of their content
and, in many cases, by the broad scope of their exceptions. As such, the
implementation of these laws will require a unique and unprecedented degree
of international political will. It is most disturbing, in this regard, that even
the astonishing cooperative effort of the international community during the
recent Gulf Conflict has not yet resulted in the institution of any criminal
proceedings for violations of the laws of warfare.
V. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE
A. Preliminary Remarks
The purpose of this article is to ascertain the extent to which interna-
tional law answers the universal demand for accountability for deliberate
wartime environmental damage. Having now examined in detail the relevant
content of International Environmental Law, the International Law of Force
and the International Law of Warfare, it is desirable to present a concise
statement of our conclusions. To this end, the principles emanating from the
various international legal instruments, shall be merged into four categories
as follows:
(a) Protection of the environment in general against wartime victimization;
262. Id. at 52.
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(b) Protection of specific areas of the environment against wartime
victimization;
(c) Protection of environmentally precarious targets against wartime attack;
(d) Collateral protection resulting from constraints on military strategy.
A global appreciation of the legal implications of deliberate wartime
environmental damage will facilitate our application of these laws to the
environmental damage perpetrated during the Persian Gulf Conflict and will
provide a basis for a discussion of reform strategies.
B. Synthesis of the Relevant Law
1. Protection of the Environment in General
Against Wartime Victimization
Principle 1: Interstate Environmental Damage
Rule: A state engaged in armed conflict must not deliberately
allow activities within its control to cause significant
environmental damage to areas beyond its national
jurisdiction.
Exceptions: The rule does not apply if the activity is carried out in
the course of a lawful use of force and either of the
following circumstances are present:
(1) the activity is necessary in order to save lives, and
the activity poses a lesser threat to life than that
which is being suppressed; or
(2) the activity is the only means of safeguarding an
essential interest of the state against a grave and
imminent danger.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to State Responsibility to
make reparation, usually in the form of monetary
compensation.
263. This is intended as a summary only, so as to enable the reader to obtain an overall
perspective on the relevant law. More extensive detail, definition and analysis can be found in
the previous sections. Citations for conventions, protocols, declarations, resolutions, cases and
other instruments have been deliberately excluded in the interests of clarity of presentation. Of
course, all the instruments have been referred to with citations on numerous occasions
throughout this article.
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Status: Customary International Law.
Major Sources: Trail Smelter Case; 1972 Stockholm Declaration
Problems: (1) Uncertainty as to the threshold quantum of dam-
age-how much damage is "significant"?
(2) Inadequacy of monetary compensation as a deter-
rent and as a means of redress.
Principle 2: Environmental Damage as a Use of Force
Rule: States must refrain from acts of environmental victim-
ization where such acts amount to a use of force against
other states.
Exception: This rule does not apply to acts performed in the course
of lawful self-defence or authorized collective security
operations.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) In all cases, states will be responsible to make
reparation, usually in the form of monetary com-
pensation.
(2) If the U.N. Security Council regards the environ-
mental damage as a "threat to peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression," then the Council may
respond by authorizing a collective military action.
(3) If the environmental damage amounts to an "ag-
gressive" use of force, then the individuals respon-
sible will be subject to criminal punishment for
"crimes against peace" for which there is universal
jurisdiction.
Status: Customary International Law.
Major Sources: U.N. Charter; Nicaragua Case; Nuremberg Charter and
Judgement; U.N. Definition of Aggression; U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687.
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Problems: (1) Uncertainty as to the exact amount of environmen-
tal damage that is required in order to constitute a
"use of force," "breach of the peace" or "act of
aggression."
(2) The field of application of the rule is limited to the
context of unlawful uses of force.
Principle 3: Environmental Modification
Rule: States involved in armed conflict must not, for the
purpose of damaging other states, deliberately manipu-
late the natural environment in a manner which causes
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.
Exceptions: None.
Responsibility:
Status:
Source:
Problems:
Violation of the rule entitles any state to bring a com-
plaint to a Consultative Committee of Experts which is
empowered to assess the situation and present a summa-
ry of its findings of fact. Alternatively, a state may
lodge a complaint with U.N. Security Council which
may then act in accordance with its powers under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
This principle only applies to states which are parties to
the 1977 En-mod Convention.
1977 En-mod Convention.
(1) Uncertainty as to the requisite quantum of damage.
When is damage "widespread, long-lasting or
severe"?
(2) The responsibility provisions are extremely inade-
quate.
(3) Important Middle Eastern countries are not bound.
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Principle 4: Environmental Warfare
Rule: States must not employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.
Exceptions: None.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) States will be responsible to make reparation in the
form of monetary compensation.
(2) Individuals who commit or order to be committed
such violations will be subject to criminal punish-
ment for "war crimes" for which there is universal
jurisdiction.
Status: This rule only applies to states which are parties to
Protocol I of 1977.
Major Sources: 1977 Protocol I.
Problems: (1) Uncertainty as to the requisite quantum of damage.
What is the scope of the terms "widespread, long-
term and severe"?
(2) The rule is not binding on any major Western,
former Soviet Bloc and Middle Eastern countries.
2. Protection of Specific Areas of the Environment
Against Wartime Victimization
Principle 5: Marine Environment
Rule: States engaged in armed conflict must minimize to the
fullest possible extent all forms of marine pollution,
including:
1992]
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(1) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances
from land-based sources, or from or through the
atmosphere.
(2) pollution from any installations and devices operat-
ing in the marine environment.
Exceptions: None.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) A state is entitled to take measures beyond its
territorial sea, proportionate to the actual or threat-
ened injury, to protect its coastline or related inter-
ests, including fishing.
(2) States are responsible to make reparation by way of
monetary compensation.
Status: Customary International Law.
Major Sources: 1982 LOS Convention.
Problems: (1) The requisite quantum of damage is, again, left
undefined.
(2) States are only required to "minimize" environ-
mental damage.
(3) The responsibility regime is extremely inadequate
for the purpose of deterrence and as a means of
redress.
Principle 6: Property
Rule: States engaged in armed conflict must not destroy
enemy property.
Exceptions: The rule does not apply if such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
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(1) States are responsible to make reparation in the
form of monetary compensation.
(2) Individuals who committed or ordered to be com-
mitted such violations shall be subject to criminal
punishment for "war crimes" for which there is
universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, states are ob-
ligated to ensure that perpetrators of such "grave
breaches" are brought to trial.
Status: Customary International Law.
Major Sources: 1907 Hague Regulations; 1949 Geneva Convention IV;
Nuremberg Charter.
Problems: (1) Many areas of the environment do not fall within
the ambit of "property."
(2) The term "military necessity" is capable of many
divergent interpretations and exposes the rule to
widespread avoidance.
Principle 7: Objects Indispensable to Civilian Survival
Rule: States engaged in armed conflict must not attack or
destroy objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas
for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water and installations, and supplies and
irrigation works.
Exceptions: The rule does not apply in the following circumstances:
(1) when objects are destroyed for purposes other than
depriving civilians of sustenance;
(2) when objects are destroyed for the specific purpose
of depriving enemy military forces of sustenance,
or;
(3) when it is militarily necessary for a state to destroy
objects in order to defend its national territory
against invasion.
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Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) States are responsible to make reparation in the
form of monetary compensation.
(2) Individuals who committed or ordered to be com-
mitted such violations shall be subject to criminal
punishment for "war crimes" for which there is
universal jurisdiction.
Status: The rule is only binding on states which are parties to
Protocol I of 1977.
Major Sources: 1977 Protocol I.
Problems: (1) The exceptions to this rule are so extensive that its
practical value is negligible.
(2) No major Western, former Soviet Block or Middle
Eastern countries are bound by the rule.
3. Protection of Environmentally Precarious
Targets Against Wartime Attack
Principle 8: Works and Installations containing Dangerous Forces
Rule: States engaged in armed conflict must not attack any of
the following works or installations if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent
severe losses among the civilian population: dams,
dykes, nuclear electrical generating stations and military
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or
installations.
Exceptions: The rule does not apply if the following circumstances
are present:
(1) the object is used in regular, significant and direct
support of military operations;
(2) the attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support, and;
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(3) if the object is a dam or a dyke, the enemy must be
using it for other than its normal function.
Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) States are responsible to make reparation in the
form of monetary compensation.
(2) Individuals who committed or ordered to be com-
mitted such violations shall be subject to criminal
punishment for "war crimes" for which there is
universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, states are
obligated to ensure that perpetrators of such "grave
breaches" are brought to trial.
Status: This rule is only binding on states which are parties to
Protocol I of 1977.
Major Sources: 1977 Protocol I.
Problems: No major Western, former Soviet Block or Middle
Eastern countries are bound by the rule.
4. Collateral Protection Resulting from Constraints on Military Strategy
Principle 9: Constraints on Military Strategy
Rule: States involved in armed conflict must not engage in
environmentally damaging activities where:
(1) such activities are not necessary to achieve a
military objective;
(2) the damage would be excessive in proportion to the
military advantage;
(3) the activities would cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering, or;
(4) the damage would impact upon civilian targets or
both civilian and military targets without discrimi-
nation.
Exceptions:
1992]
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Responsibility: Violations of the rule give rise to the following conse-
quences:
(1) States are responsible to make reparation in the
form of monetary compensation.
(2) Individuals who committed or ordered to be com-
mitted such violations shall be subject to criminal
punishment for "war crimes" for which there is
universal jurisdiction. Certain states which regard
such violations as "grave breaches" are obligated
to ensure that perpetrators are brought to trial.
Status: Customary International Law (except for the character-
ization of violations as "grave breaches," which is only
binding on states which are parties to Protocol I of
1977).
Major Sources: 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration; 1907 Hague Regula-
tions; 1977 Protocol I.
Problems: The generality and vagueness of these constraints
exposes the rule to divergent interpretations, subjective
judgement and wholesale exploitation and avoidance.
C. Examination of the Persian Gulf Conflict
The deliberate, massive environmental damage in the recent Persian Gulf
Conflict provides an immediate practical context within which we may
observe the strengths and weaknesses of existing international law on
deliberate wartime environmental damage. Although it is beyond the scope
of this article to engage in a detailed assessment of the environmental damage
inflicted during the conflict, we shall briefly outline the known circumstances
and consequences of the oil spill and oil-well fires, so as to provide a factual
basis for our legal analysis.
1. The Environmental Damage
(a) The Oil Spill. On January 19, 1991, two days after the commence-
ment of hostilities, a giant oil slick began to form in the Persian Gulf off the
Kuwaiti coast. By 15 April the slick was estimated to be "in the order of six
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million barrels,"'" as compared to the release of only 250,000 barrels in
the 1989 Exon Valdez disaster.' Australian Foreign Minister, Senator
Gareth Evans reported the existence of "credible evidence that the spill was
deliberately engineered by the Iraqis ... These particular environmental
consequences are not to be attributed . . . to the inadvertent effect of
artillery action or things of this kind."' As to Iraqi motives, American
officials were only able to speculate that Iraq was "attempting to disrupt
allied military manoeuvres, or befoul desalting plants, or produce a kind of
ecological terrorism in retribution for the bombing.7 "
Pictured on television screens across the globe, the first tragic victims
of the spill were the numerous species of marine life which make up the rich
and diverse ecology of the Persian Gulf:
The slick has killed an estimated twenty to thirty thousand sea birds...
Small numbers of turtles and sea snakes seem to have died by being
smothered from the oil. Fish mortalities have been fairly localised to
shrimps and crabs which have died in very large numbers... Within the
impacted area, most of the salt marshes and all of the mangroves have been
oiled. It is likely then that all of the mangroves and virtually all of the salt
marshes will die.'
The local human population directly suffered as a result of the impact of the
spill on the Gulfs commercial fisheries. The Gulf fisheries "are of great
cultural and economic importance. For centuries they have provided a
livelihood for coastal communities, and the use of simple fishing traps set on
the intertidal zone continues today.'
In terms of the future, Australian marine biologists are pessimistic:
It will simply not be possible to clean up many of the Gulf's habitats once
they have become contaminated by oil. Access is limited, and physical
removal so difficult that greater damage may be done by trying. Heavy
264. Ros Kelly, Question Times, House of Representatives, April 15, 1991 (televised on
Channel 2, April 15, 1991, 11:30 pm). The Minister explained that her report was based on
information supplied by two Australian oil-spill experts in the Gulf: "The reality of it is you
can't read this sort of thing in the newspaper. This comes from advisors that this Government
has taken the trouble to send to the area." (on file with author).
265. "Ecological Consequences of the Arabian Gulf Oil Spill," Saudi Arabian National
Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development (NCWCD), Fact File dated 25
February 1991 (on file with author).
266. News Conference, Parliament House, January 26, 1991, Transcript, at 3 (on file with
author).
267. Robert McFadden, Oil Threatens Fishing and Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991,
at 4.
268. Kelly, supra note 264.
269. Charles Sheppard & Andrew Price, Will Marine Life Survive the Gulf War?, NEW
SCIENTIST, Mar. 9, 1991, at 37.
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machinery may be used to scrape oil off beaches but on thousands of hect-
ares of soft blue-green algae flats it will be useless.m
(b) The Oil-Well Fires. On January 22, 1991, U.S. reconnaissance
satellites detected plumes of dark smoke erupting from oil refineries and oil
installations in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. 1  During mid-February, more
fields were set ablaze in western Kuwait. In the final two weeks of the war,
Iraq embarked upon large-scale sabotage of oil wells, especially in the
Burgan field.' By 2 April 1991, 517 of Kuwait's 1,080 wells were
ablaze, burning 3-4 million barrels of oil per day.' The general percep-
tion was that the sabotage was part of a vindictive "scorched earth" policy,
although one Pentagon spokesman speculated that "there is an advantage
from their point of view of starting a fire. It creates smoke, some would
obscure the ground, make it difficult for us to find targets."274
The fire blackened the skies, turning day into night in areas as far as
Turkey and Qatar. Sooty acid rain has fallen in Saudi Arabia and Iran and
"reports of black snow in the Himalayas came from Swiss skiers."275 The
increase in soil acidity causes metal contamination, pollution of water
supplies, reduction in farming yields and destruction of up to 60% of the
forests in the impacted area.'
Kuwaiti environmental experts have said that "spending one day in
Kuwait City could be the equivalent of smoking 250 cigarettes."' m  Dr.
Sefein, a surgeon at Ahmadi Hospital in Kuwait, said he was dealing with
"20 to 30 new cases every day involving breathing problems, articaria,
running noses, boils and sore throats."27 Dr. El Yacoub of the Kuwaiti
Institute for Scientific Research reported that examination of several recently
slaughtered sheep had revealed severe irritation of the lungs: "It means the
hydrocarbons are taken to the smallest cell of the body, which means in the
long term, the chances of cancer increase.'
At one stage, scientists predicted that "a pall of smoke over the Indian
sub-continent ... could reduce the temperature gradient and shut down the
270. Id. at 39.
271. Philip Shenon, Iraq Sets Oil Refineries Afire, N.Y. Tmes, Jan. 23, 1991, at Al, A6.
272. Information Update, Kuwait's Oil Fires, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Apr.
2, 1991 (on file with author).
273. Id.
274. Tom Fiedler, Oil fires blanket Kuwait in smoke, AGE, Feb. 14, 1991, at 1.
275. Black Snow, AGE, Apr. 1, 1991, at 11.
276. Information Update, Kuwait's Oil Fires, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2
April 1991.
277. Oil fire pollution drives away 150,000 Kuwaitis, Sydney Morning Herald, Mar. 27, 1991,
at 11.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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monsoon, bringing drought to hundreds of millions of people.' "  Al-
though this did not eventuate, the mere possibility provides considerable
cause for concern.
2. Application of the Relevant Law"'
(a) Principle 1: Interstate Environmental Damage. Both the pumping
of oil into the Persian Gulf and the ignition of oil-wells took place in an area
within the control of Iraq, namely Kuwaiti Territory. These activities caused
environmental damage in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and many other states,
all of which were beyond the national jurisdiction of Iraq. Hence, provided
this damage can be regarded as "significant," Iraq has violated Principle 1,
as derived from the Trail Smelter Casem and the 1972 Stockholm Declara-
tion.' Note that the exceptions to Principle 1 do not apply because Iraq
was engaged in an unlawful use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter.'
Can the environmental damage caused by the spill and the fires be
regarded as "significant"? It is unfortunate that this term has not been
further defined. In this instance, however, it may observed that the damage
inflicted in the Gulf was far greater than the damage caused to the state of
Washington by emissions from the Canadian Smelter Plant. Since the
Tribunal in the Trail Smelter Case' found there to be sufficient damage
to justify an award of compensation and injunctive relief, a fortiori the
damage in the Gulf may safely be regarded as "significant."
(b) Principle 2: Environmental Damage as a Use of Force. To the
extent that the pumping of oil into the Gulf and the ignition of oil-well fires
constitutes a "use of force," Iraq has violated Principle 2, as derived from
the U.N. Charter'. Note that the exceptions to this Principle do not apply
because Iraq was not engaged in authorized collective security, nor was it
acting lawfully in self defence.'
Applying the conception of force which we developed in the previous
section, it is evident that Iraq's acts of environmental victimization had an
adverse physical impact upon other states. The question remains, however,
280. Fred Pearce, Desert Fires Cast a Shadow Over Asia, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 12, 1991, at
31.
281. Only Principles 1, 2, 5, 6 and 9 are applicable here. Principles 3, 4, 7 and 8 are derived
from conventions and protocols to which Iraq is not a party and which, as explained in the
previous sections, have not crystallized into customary international law. See section I(B), infra.
282. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
283. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at 1416.
284. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42, art. 2(4).
285. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
286. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 42.
287. Id. art. 51.
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whether the damage was sufficient in degree to amount to a "use of force"?
This question is answered by paragraph 16 of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687 which expressly "re-affirms that Iraq ... is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources . . . as a result of Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."' This resolution imposes
liability for an unlawful use of force, acknowledging expressly that the
unlawful use of force included environmental damage.
The Security Council did not specifically declare that the environmental
damage constituted a "breach of the peace." From a practical perspective,
however, the Security Council had already characterized Iraq's invasion as
a "breach of the peace" and hence there was no need to further characterize
individual acts in such terms.'
Whether or not the environmental damage can be characterized as
"aggressive" depends on the gravity of the threat to future civilization posed
by Iraq's actions. Although the full ramifications of Iraq's environmental
victimization will not be known for some time, it is clear that Iraq's actions
have imperilled the health and in some cases the survival of millions of
people in countries as far as Iran and India. The threat is potentially global.
For these reasons, it is submitted that the environmental damage alone is
sufficient to characterize Iraq's invasion and occupation as a "war of
aggression."
(c) Principle 5: The Marine Environment. Iraq's deliberate pumping of
oil into the Gulf certainly amounts to a release of a harmful substance from
a land-based source. It would also constitute pollution from an installation
operating in the marine environment. All evidence indicates that the spill
was the result of deliberate sabotage by Iraq, so as to preclude any
suggestion that Iraq sought to minimize the damage. On this basis, it may
be concluded that Iraq has violated Principle 5, as derived from customary
international law (as reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention.)'
(d) Principle 6: Property. Much of the environmental damage inflicted
by Iraq can be characterized as "destruction of property." The despoiling
of crops and farmland by acid rain, the poisoning of livestock by polluted air
and the devastation of hundreds of oil installations by fire, are but a few
examples. All this damage caused by Iraq prima facie amounts to a violation
of Principle 6, as derived from the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949
Geneva Conventions.9 1 But we must consider the application of the
288. U.N. Doe. S/22430 91-10541 32902(E), supra note 66.
289. S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (2932d mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (199) (resolution of
August 2, 1990).
290. U.N. Do. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982).
291. Roberts & Guclff, supra note 222.
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exception to Principle 6 for destruction rendered absolutely necessary by
military operations. Iraq would certainly argue that the oil spill was
militarily necessary in order to deter an amphibious attack and that the oil
fires were militarily necessary in order to obscure the vision of allied pilots
engaged in aerial attacks. The Allies, on the other hand, might argue that
the spilled oil would have had a negligible effect on any amphibious attack
and that the blackened skies were only a very minor irritation to Allied
pilots. Applying the "general theory of military necessity" which we
developed in the previous section, the following observations may be made:
(1) There was arguably some military benefit (albeit small) in polluting the
Gulf and blackening the skies;
(2) The magnitude of the damage to persons and objects unconnected to the
military targets was indisputably far greater than the magnitude of the
military advantage;
(3) This disparity is evident from the vast amount of superfluous injury
(which had no connection to the prevention of allied amphibious landings
or to obscuring the vision of allied pilots) and from the substantial (as
opposed to incidental) devastation of civilian objects;
(4) The disparity could reasonably have been anticipated by Iraq, as
evidenced by the numerous predictions and warnings by environ-
mentalists, scientists and other experts, even in advance of the military
confrontation, of severe environmental devastation;
(5) Therefore, Iraq cannot invoke the doctrine of "military necessity" as a
defence.
Even independently of this process of analysis, it may be argued that the
majority of the oil-well fires, having been triggered by Iraq in the course of
its retreat in the final hours of battle, could not reasonably have been
regarded as militarily advantageous by any standards. Hence, on any
interpretation of the "military necessity" exception, the ignition of the oil
fires cannot escape illegality.
(e) Principle 9: Constraints on Military Strategy. Principle 9 requires
us to consider whether the oil spill and fires were militarily necessary, were
proportionate to the expected military gain, avoided superfluous injury and
impacted specifically on military targets.
Considering each of the 4 criteria individually, we immediately
encounter the recurrent problem of ascertaining exactly what is meant by the
terms "military necessity," "proportionality," "superfluous" and "civilian
object." We have already demonstrated (in our discussion of Principle 6)
how easy it would be for opposing states, taking different views of the scope
of "military necessity," to invoke a variety of competing arguments in their
respective favors. Our "general theory of military necessity," encompassing
all four constraints, was applied in relation to Principle 6 (destruction of
property not justified by military necessity) and will not be repeated here.
1992]
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In summary, however, it might be said that the damage inflicted was grossly
excessive in relation to the meager potential for military gain.
3. Responsibility for Violations
All violations of the relevant laws give rise to state responsibility to
make reparation. Iraq's obligation to provide monetary compensation for all
the environmental damage has in fact been incorporated into paragraph 16 of
Security Council Resolution 687 (the "cease-fire resolution").'
Furthermore, violations of Principle 6 (destruction of property) and
Principle 9 (constraints on military strategy) amount to "war crimes." Any
state which is able to secure custody of those persons who committed or
ordered the destruction of property or the violation of the general constraints
on military strategy, is entitled to prosecute those persons in its domestic
courts and to impose criminal punishment including, where appropriate, the
death penalty. Indeed, those who planned, prepared and organized the
environmental victimization can be regarded as having planned, prepared and
organized a "war of aggression"-a "crime against peace" for which there
is also individual criminal responsibility.'
D. Suggestions for Improvement
The nine principles, articulated and applied in the previous sections,
demonstrate that international law, more by accident than by design, does
impose a degree of accountability (including individual accountability) for
deliberate wartime environmental damage. At the same time, however, our
analysis has exposed substantive deficiencies in each of the principles and in
the existing law in general. In this section, we shall build upon our analysis
of existing international law by first suggesting ways of strengthening the
existing nine principles and, secondly, proposing a framework for a
comprehensive package of international law directly addressing the problem
of deliberate wartime environmental damage.
1. Improvement of Existing Laws
It is entirely conceivable that international armed conflict will erupt and
threaten the natural environment long before the lengthy process of preparing
and negotiating a comprehensive package of applicable international law can
be completed. In the interim, therefore, states should be encouraged to
collectively (or at least individually) contribute to the following piecemeal
reforms of existing law:
292. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doe. S/22430 (1991).
293. Nurcmburg Charter, supra note 121.
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(1) States which are not yet parties to the 1976 En-mod Convention and
1977 Protocol I should ratify these instruments as soon as possible. If
states find particular provisions unacceptable, they should be encouraged
to expressly declare their acceptance of all the other provisions, thereby
enabling these provisions to enter into customary international law.
(2) States should declare their understanding of the minimum quantum of
damage required in relation to Principle 1 (interstate environmental
damage), as derived from the Stockholm Declaration and the Trail
Smelter Case. Since a violation of Principle 1 only results in an
obligation to pay monetary compensation, states should be willing to
agree that the principle should apply to any environmental damage,
provided it is "measurable."
(3) Although we have demonstrated, on the basis of customary international
law, that environmental damage is capable of constituting a "use of
force," "breach of peace" or "act of aggression," these principles will
be more effective for the purpose of deterrence if states expressly declare
their understanding to this effect. For example, the 1974 U.N.
Definition of Aggression could be amended to expressly include
"deliberate environmental damage" in its non-exhaustive enumeration of
"acts of aggression."'
(4) The major deficiency in both the 1976 En-mod Convention and Protocol
I of 1977 lies in the uncertain scope of the terms "widespread,"
"long-term" and "severe." Hence, states should be strongly encouraged
to reach an agreement as to the meaning of these terms. It is not
realistic to attempt here to predict the definitions which states are likely
to accept. Nevertheless, environmental manipulation of such severity
that modern science is not even able to predict the consequences should
certainly be deemed to satisfy the requisite quantum of damage.
(5) The prohibition on destruction of property, not justified by military
necessity, could be considerably strengthened if states were prepared to
declare that, for the purpose of that prohibition, "property" includes any
aspect of the natural environment.
(6) Principle 5, related to marine pollution, is expressed in terms of an
obligation to "minimize to the fullest possible extent" damage to the
marine environment. States should be encouraged to expressly declare
that any pollution of the sea for military purposes constitutes a violation
of this obligation.
(7) The extensive protection conferred upon dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations by Article 56 of 1977 Protocol I should be
extended, particularly in light of the Gulf Conflict, to other installations
containing dangerous forces such as oil wells, oil tankers and oil
pumping stations. This could be achieved by either making the list of
294. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp., No. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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protected installations non-exhaustive or by adding oil installations to the
list of specifically protected targets.
(8) The uncertainty created by the concept of "military necessary" could be
substantially resolved if states were to expressly adopt the "general
theory of military necessity" which we developed in an earlier section
and which was derived from existing principles of customary internation-
al law.
2. A Comprehensive Package of International Law
The preparation and negotiation of a comprehensive legal package
designed to directly address the problem of deliberate wartime environmental
damage is a lengthy, complex and most demanding challenge which,
nevertheless, must be confronted by the international community. In July of
1991, environmentalists, scientists, politicians and international lawyers
gathered together in Ottawa for a Conference on the Use of the Environment
as a Tool of Conventional Warfare. The delegates discussed the environmen-
tal damage caused by the Gulf War, the relevant rules of existing interna-
tional law and the need for clarification and reform. Although the confer-
ence did not produce any new laws or any extrapolations of existing laws,
it marks the very beginning of the process of developing a body of
international law specifically directed at wartime environmental protection.
It is hoped that this process might eventually lead to the adoption of a set of
principles based on the following outline:
(a) General Protection of the Environment Against Warfare
This section would prohibit any wartime conduct which is intended or could
reasonably be expected to cause significant damage to the natural environ-
ment. "Significant" should be further defined in terms of the area of
damage, the duration of damage and the seriousness of damage. This might
be expressed in terms of a "definable region of damage" so as to include, for
example, destruction of a forest but not destruction of a few trees.
(b) Protection of Specific Parts of the Environment
(i) Air
This part should prohibit any conduct intended or reasonably expected to
result in weather modification, depletion of the ozone layer, acid rain, toxic
levels of radiation fall-out and poisoning of the air. Air pollution in general
should be prohibited in the same manner as the general prohibition in Part
(a).
(ii) Sea
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This section should prohibit the dumping, pumping or releasing of particular
types of harmful substances into the marine environment. The specific
protections enjoyed by the marine environment under the Law of the Sea
Convention might be reiterated here. Pollution of the sea in general should
be prohibited in the same manner as the general protection conferred by Part
(a).
(iii) Land
This section should specifically protect forests, crops, farmlands, agriculture,
wildlife and livestock. Pollution of the land and of objects on the land
should be prohibited generally in the same manner as the general prohibition
in Part (a).
(c) Protection of Environmentally Precarious Targets
The purpose of this section is to protect works and installations which, if
attacked, could endanger the environment by the release of harmful
substances and forces. The section should commence with a general
provision prohibiting attacks on any works or installations which contain
environmentally hazardous substances or forces. There should also be a
non-exhaustive enumeration of specific installations to be protected: dams,
dykes, nuclear installations, chemical plants and oil installations.
(d) The "Military Necessity" Exception
The infliction of environmental damage in circumstances of military necessity
should constitute an exception to the prohibitions in Parts (a), (b) and (c).
However, "military necessity" must be strictly and narrowly defined in very
specific terms. The "general theory of military necessity" which we
developed in Section IV might be an appropriate starting point from which
to develop this exception.
(e) Responsibility for Violations
The success of the entire legal package will largely depend upon the nature
and extent of responsibility flowing from violations of the principles. To this
end, individuals engaged in the planning, ordering or commission or viola-
tions of the principles should be deemed guilty of "grave war crimes." Such
crimes should invoke not only universal jurisdiction, but a universal
obligation to locate suspected criminals, bring them to trial and punish those
who are found guilty. This section should also expressly impose upon
offending states an obligation to pay monetary compensation for any damage
flowing from their violations of the principles. Of course, none of these
provisions should prejudice the power of the U.N. Security Council to take
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further diplomatic, economic or even military measures in accordance with
Sections VI and VII of the U.N. Charter.
The above suggestions are neither comprehensive nor detailed. They are
intended only as an outline of the main substantive principles which should
be incorporated in a comprehensive package of international law dealing with
deliberate wartime environmental damage. A number of procedural matters
also require close attention. It is submitted, for example, that the new rules
should not come into effect until they have been accepted or ratified by at
least the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Further-
more, there is much merit in the suggestion by Canadian M.P., Patrick
Boyer, that there should be established an International Green Cross to
respond to environmental calamities just as the Red Cross responds to war's
human calamities and suffering.2 At the very least, these suggestions,
together with the substantive principles proposed above, should provide a
strong foundation upon which to build an effective legal regime to address
the challenge of wartime environmental protection.
E. Conclusion
In concluding, it must be emphasized that the existence of applicable
laws is no guarantee of their implementation, and the availability of avenues
of reform does not mean they will eventuate. Until recently, there was every
reason to be skeptical. After all, the environment had suffered war wounds
before without any legal repercussions.
Today, however, the spread of democracy, the demise of communism
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the new spirit of international
cooperation demonstrated in the Persian Gulf and, most importantly, the
rapid evolution of environmental culture, all provide considerable cause for
optimism. As one reporter observed:
What is different now is, in part, the greening of our consciousness. No
one who watched the oil spill in Alaska, the clean up of the Exxon Valdez,
can be unaffected by a deliberate, one-man assault on a sea. No one in the
recycling, rain-forest-saving,_conservation mind-set can fail to be appalled
by such deliberate wasting.2"
At first, it was the innocence and vulnerability of marine life which aroused
our emotions during the Gulf Conflict: "The newest victims of this war wear
no dog tags. They carry no proof of nationality. They espouse no convic-
tion that God or justice or history is on their side. Indeed they take no
side. " ' This concern, however, was rapidly surpassed by the grave
295. Tim Harper, Support growing for environmental response team, TORONTO STAR, July 13,
1991, at A19.
296. Ellen Goodman, A crime against humanity and nature, Cxi. TRiB., Feb. 3, 1991, at 4.
297. id.
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realization that environmental victimization is actually capable of bringing
about the end of humanity and the death of our planet: "The days where we
thought the planet could absorb all types of abuse are over. Protection of the
environment has become a key issue because we have finally realized that
our survival is at stake. "
The astonishing realignment of political powers and the unstoppable
forces of freedom and democracy, have produced a climate of international
cooperation uniquely favorable to the enforcement of Iraqi responsibility
under existing international law, and to the development of a more effective
and comprehensive body of law. In a visionary statement likely to be cited
for years to come, then U.S. President George Bush contemplated the new
opportunities for the enforcement and development of international law:
This is an historic moment. We have in the past year made great progress
in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the
opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world
order, a world where the rule of law not the law of the jungle, governs the
conduct of nations.'
The ability of international law to meet the challenge of environmental
protection will no doubt be a critical factor in the realization of this "new
world order." We must all share in the hope that:
even in the devastating business of killing each other, there may be enough
sanity for a consensus, enough sense of preservation to at least have a rule
on the book and in our minds against waging war on the very environment
we must share when the war is over.'
298. Extract from address by Mary Collins P.C. M.P., to the Conference on the Use of the
Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare. Transcript obtained from Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra). (on file with author).
299. President George Bush, Address to the Nation, Washington D.C., January 16, 1991,
reprinted in 57 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, No. 8, Feb. 1, 1991, at 227.
300. Goodman, supra note 296, at 4.
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